KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
Contents:
The key to effective action and hence the key to effectively sustain one’s own life is to deal with reality, which means to know it and understand it. Hence, it is key to understand the source of knowledge and thereby understand what is knowledge and what is the false or the arbitrary leading you away from reality. Now, note two things: (1) if nothing is certain, nothing can be known and all you can do is babble and blunder (I shall show later why such is the case), and (2) to the extent that you feel certain for the wrong thing and have no means to right yourself, to that extent you are helpless in reality. Hence, we must grasp with rigour what to be certain of and what to question. How can we do it? By understanding what is the basis of certainty, i.e. what is knowledge. Moreover, we must understand what is the nature of knowledge and certainty so that we can learn to recognise them and hold onto them.
Right purposeful action presupposes right purposeful cognition.
This section is lifted directly from Metaphysics.
LEXICAL NOTE:
To affirm something is to grasp (either explicitly or implicitly) that it exists, i.e. that it is real. To accept something is to hold that it exists; acceptance can also exist when what is being accepted does not exist. Hence, affirmation is affirmation of what is, whereas acceptance is acceptance of a proposition about something that either is or may be or is not or may not be. Note also that to deny something is to hold that it does not exist (it is the inverse of acceptance); denial can also exist when what is being denied does exist. Hence, note a key point: accepting or denying something is independent of affirming it, since you affirm it as long as you grasp and rely on its existence.
Back to the main topic…
The self-evident is the direct awareness of reality. It is the opposite of the arbitrary; the self-evident is inherent in the awareness of existence as such and is that which is given to us by reality directly. Hence, the self-evident is also the opposite of faith, which is why it is important to see how we reach the fact that something is self-evident. I shall show that the self-evident is at the core of all awareness and all knowledge. Hence, by its nature, the self-evident is that which one affirms even in trying to deny it, since no act of awareness can deny that which awareness presupposes by its very existence (needless to say, the unaware cannot affirm, accept or deny anything).
To be aware of something is to perceive and thereby affirm that it is, i.e. that it exists. Note that awareness is always awareness of something; awareness of nothing is unawareness. Now, note that knowledge is the retained awareness of something. Hence, to know something is to affirm that it is and retain the affirmation. Now, note that my awareness is, i.e. it exists; if it does not, I can affirm, accept or deny nothing, i.e. I can say nothing. To the extent that I say something, to that extent I affirm that my awareness is, i.e. that I am aware. Hence, since knowledge is the retained awareness of something, and since I am aware and capable of retaining my awareness of things, knowledge is, i.e. knowledge exists. In other words, since I am aware and capable of retaining my awareness of things, I know something and never nothing.
To put it briefly, the self-evident is something so inherent in your very awareness of existence that as long as you exist, you cannot but affirm it; denying it is the denial of awareness and existence as such.
NOTE: Existence can never be truly denied, since even to deny, you must stay in existence, and beyond existence, no capacity for denial exists.
Here, we only reaffirm what was said in the above discussion on self-evidence.
From the above discussion on self-evidence, we see that to know something is to be aware of something that exists, i.e. something that is a part of reality. In other words, a piece of knowledge is a fact grasped by consciousness, i.e. it is a conscious unit that corresponds to reality based on self-evident truths such that denying it would ultimately lead you to affirm it (“ultimately” is used because more than one self-evident truth may be needed to reach the affirmation; we shall soon see why). Hence, self-evidence, i.e. the direct awareness of something that exists, is the basis of all knowledge.
Awareness begins at perception, but we also grasp that we can selectively focus on some parts of our perception isolated from the other parts. Note that we do have the capacity for selective focus. How do we know that we do? By the self-evident fact that we are aware of our retained awareness and thus can focus on parts of our retained awareness, which means we can focus on parts of perception itself just as we focus on parts of the world outside our consciousness. Note that selective focus naturally extends to all conscious units, not just percepts but also units, concepts, generalisations, etc.
Importance and use of selective focus…
In Integration of Perception, we see how selective focus leads to the capacity for abstraction, which is necessary to know reality beyond direct perception by relating facts to a broader context of facts. For example, we can relate our interactions with various metal items to each other to observe similarities that also distinguish them from items made of other materials (e.g. we can polish them to make them shine, we can hit them against hard surfaces to make bright sounds, we can bend sufficiently thin metal items and they keep their bent shape, etc.). Then, when we observe a new item with similar characteristics, we can explore it with the knowledge that it may be a metal item and may have the other characteristics observed in the metal items we know.
As another example, we can relate our interactions with solid objects to each other and to our interactions with semi-solids and liquids to observe the similarities that also distinguish them from the others (e.g. fixed shape when pressed, moved and struck against other objects). We can hence observe that some characteristics that distinguish solids are also necessary to, say, stack objects in a stable heap. Hence, we can relate our knowledge of solid objects to any new solid object we observe and thereby know (without any further observations) whether it can be made a part of a stable heap. Expanding on the example, we can relate our knowledge of how shape, weight and support affects a solid object’s stability to know (without any further observations) which new solid objects to put at the bottom of the heap and which to put at the top.
As a more complex example, consider Newton’s first law of motion (“every object will remain at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by an external force”), where Newton related observations of the horizontal movement of different objects in different surfaces, selectively focusing on the difference that made the difference, namely, the amount of friction of the surface. Hence, he could identify that the friction of a surface was the causal factor in slowing down a body moving on the surface, from which he grasped that in the absence of friction, the object would not slow down. He also related observations of the motion of objects to selectively focus on the fact that an increase in an object’s speed was caused by an external force, in the absence of which it would not speed up. Similarly, he grasped that nothing except an external force caused the change in the direction of an object’s motion. Without selective focus, every observation would be a whole new phenomenon with no relationship (beyond perceptual similarities and differences) to other observations.
NOTE 1: We see that the capacity for selective focus is a self-evident fact. Hence, it is still the case, even with the use of selective focus, that the self-evident is the basis of all knowledge.
NOTE 2: Selective focus naturally extends to any and every conscious unit, not just percepts. In other words, we can selectively focus on previous results of selective focus. Hence, we can have abstractions of abstractions: units of units, concepts of concepts, generalisations of generalisations, etc.
The importance and use of selective focus in expanding knowledge leads us to the next point…
LEXICAL NOTE:
The purpose of the concept of “selective focus” is to distinguish between automatic awareness and non-automatic awareness of awareness itself, i.e. of conscious units. Hence, by selective focus, I do not mean a selective grasp of reality as such. Why? Because due to the finite capacity of consciousness, any grasp of reality is necessarily selective. Therefore, using the concept of “selective focus” to refer to a selective grasp of reality as such results is an unnecessarily broad concept which I have no use for. Hence, by selective focus, I mean specifically the focus directed toward one’s own awareness as such, i.e. toward conscious units rather than directly toward reality. This distinction is essential, because in essence, turning your senses volitionally toward something leads to the same perception as having your senses forcefully turned toward it. However, no one can physically force you to think beyond direct perception, since fundamentally, only you have ability to direct your own selective focus (see: “Determinism is the denial of causality” from Human Consciousness and Free Will). Here, volition is an essential factor because only volition can make one’s cognition purposeful and thereby possible beyond the perceptual level (to understand why cognition is necessarily purposeful, see: “Unpurposeful abstraction fallacy” from Contextual Clarity).
Knowledge is the retained awareness of that which corresponds to reality, and knowledge can only be knowledge of and from the self-evident, because only the self-evident is given by reality. To re-emphasise, only something ultimately given by reality to the consciousness is knowledge of reality, but something given by reality is self-evident, i.e. even to deny its existence is to affirm it, since it just is. Now, if knowledge is only of the self-evident, then expanding our knowledge beyond perception can only be awareness of what is self-evidently implicit in our perception. As we have seen, such awareness is only reached by selective focus. Hence, we see that knowledge has only two means: grasping the self-evident and selectively focusing on the self-evident. Of course, selective focus can only lead to knowledge if used to grasp what is self-evidently implicit in the self-evident.
NOTE 1: To grasp the self-evidently implicit is to grasp something that is self-evident when brought it into focus. In other words, the self-evidently implicit is that which cannot be denied without denying the self-evident, i.e. it is logically necessitated by the self-evident. Hence, we reaffirm the notion that knowledge can only be knowledge of and from the self-evident. The self-evidently implicit is not self-evident without selective focus because (1) focus is finite and cannot always grasp every aspect of awareness at once (which is why retained awareness is invaluable, as it holds everything that cannot be focused on at once), and (2) many facts relate to aspects that do not exist by themselves in reality (e.g. attributes, actions, etc.) and thus cannot be grasped by perceptual means alone.
NOTE 2: Bringing something implicit in perception into focus — especially something that integrates more than one perception — is not an automatic process but an exercise of volition. It is not automatic because to be automatic in cognition is to be driven by the self-evident alone, whereas selective focus is fundamentally self-driven and not led along purely by the self-evident (see “Determinism as a denial of causality” in Human Consciousness and Free Will).
NOTE 3: The act of grasping the self-evidently implicit can naturally be recursive, as selective focus can be recursive. Hence, we can grasp the self-evidently implicit in what we previously grasped as self-evidently implicit in the self-evident, and so on. Hence, we can have abstractions of abstractions: units of units, concepts of concepts, generalisations of generalisations, etc.
Defining the faculty of gaining knowledge…
The faculty of grasping the self-evident and selectively focusing on it is what we refer to as “reason”. In the fundamentals of epistemology, reason has been defined as the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by direct experience. Note that this definition is essentially the same as the new one I have expressed here. Hence, to bring together what has been said: the only means of knowledge is reason. The use of any other faculty (e.g. imagination, intuition, etc.) can be a means of knowledge if and only if it is part of the application of reason (e.g. using intuition to reveal a potential solution to a problem before validating it, using emotion as the material for introspection, using instinct to navigate an environment as a part of learning more about it, etc.).
Grasping the means of knowledge leads us to a key fact about knowledge…
LEXICAL NOTE:
By “relational” here, I mean hierarchical and contextual. By hierarchical, I mean the relationships between the lower, i.e. more concrete forms to higher, i.e. more abstract forms of knowledge. By contextual, I mean the relationships between known facts in general.
All knowledge is either directly self-evident or selective focus of the self-evident. Let us begin at the directly self-evident. The retained direct perception of something is result of sensations from some source in reality retained in a particular spatial and temporal order. In other words, the retained direct perception of something is the result of sensations retained in relation to each other. But what about retained sensations in isolation? Sensations as such are the effects of some part of reality on your faculty of awareness, which means retained sensations in isolation exist in relation to the current presence or absence of the same sensations.
Now, let us move to higher forms of knowledge. As we have seen, selective focus can be selective focus of either some parts of a conscious unit or parts relating two or more conscious units. Hence, selective focus differentiates (i.e. differentiating parts of a unit from the whole or differentiating two or more units by their differences) and integrates (i.e. integrating parts of a unit into the whole or integrating two or more units by their similarities). In both cases, new knowledge is gained only by relating something to something else, e.g. identifying a part of a unit in relation to the whole or identifying a relationship between two or more units. The fact that knowledge is relational is made more apparent by seeing how we gain knowledge beyond perception, namely unit-perception, concept-formation and generalisation.
NOTE: When gaining knowledge of the parts of a unit, you necessarily identify them in relation to the whole. Why? Consider: what if you regard each part as separate from the whole? Then, your grasp of each part as well as your grasp of the parts together do not correspond to reality, since you regard them as separate from the whole when they are not. In other words, such a disintegrated grasp of reality does not lead to knowledge.
To further show why all knowledge is relational, consider: what does it mean to know about something? Self-evidence only tells you that it is, but it does not tell you what it is, i.e. how it exists and acts in reality. Reality is integrated by identity and causality, i.e. everything in reality exists in some logical and/or causal relationship to everything else, so to understand how something exists and acts in reality, we must understand how it is related to other parts of reality. Even if we observe something in isolation, we can know about its nature, i.e. about the factors behind its characteristics and behaviour only if we understand how its parts exist and act in relation to each other; if we do not relate its parts with each other, all we can know about it is the self-evident, i.e. that it is what it is and acts as it acts. Hence, any purposeful cognition about something (i.e. the pursuit of knowledge about something beyond the self-evident) has to be done in relation to a context of facts, and since all cognition is necessarily purposeful (see: “Unpurposeful abstraction fallacy” from Contextual Clarity), all cognition and thus all knowledge is done in relation to a context of facts, i.e. all knowledge is relational.
Now for a key point addressing the negation or rejection of knowledge…
Given that knowledge is only of and from the self-evident, what about the false (i.e. that which is contradicted by known facts) and the arbitrary (i.e. that which has no basis in known facts)? Note a key point: speaking of the irreducible units of awareness, what is, is, and what is not, is not, and cannot be thought of. In other words, by the nature of the relationship between consciousness and reality (see “The primacy of existence” in Metaphysics), the irreducible conscious units that form the basis of awareness can only be from reality apart from consciousness.
However, while our irreducible conscious units are from reality apart from consciousness, it is self-evident that we have the capacity to combine conscious units independent of how their referents exist together in reality. For example, we can combine the idea of “infinity” (which applies only for potential) and say that something is “actually infinite” (e.g. the infinite wisdom of God, the infinite size of the universe, etc.). Similarly, we can take the concepts of consciousness and agency, detach them from their contexts and then combine them to form the idea of disembodied eternal “spirits”. Such combinations contradict reality by throwing aside the context in which the chosen conscious units refer to reality. Yet, such false constructs are indeed conscious units we can hold in our minds. Evidently, then, such a faculty must be the basis for the false.
As another example, we observe fishes and we observe women. Now, a fish tail exists only for a fish but not a woman, while a woman’s torso exists only for a woman and not a fish. But, of course, we can combine these components in our minds to create the idea of a mermaid. A mermaid has no referent in known reality but the conscious unit certainly exists and each of its components certainly refers to a part of reality. Evidently, then, such a faculty must be the basis for the arbitrary.
Hence, we get the following…
A false claim arises when we accept as truth some combination of conscious units that — as an integrated whole — contradicts known reality (note that reality is non-contradictory, which means if something contradicts a part of reality, it contradicts the whole of reality). An arbitrary claim arises when we accept as truth some combination of conscious units that — as an integrated whole — has no referent in known reality. It may well be that upon learning more about reality, an arbitrary claim may turn out as either true or false. But as such, an arbitrary claim is neither, as it is detached from knowledge and thus detached from any means of knowing truth or falsehood.
NOTE: I am not derogating imagination as such, which is a valuable faculty both in cognition and apart from cognition. I am only derogating the acceptance of imagined entities as real entities without reference to reason. Also, note that I am not derogating the capacity to consider contradictions and floating abstractions. Such a capacity is necessary in order to pursue the truth; our pursuit of truth beyond the perceptual level is non-automatic and we are neither omniscient nor infallible, which means we must actively validate our conscious units, achieving certainty where possible and being open to grasping our errors where we are uncertain. Moreover, the false and the arbitrary can be good material to strengthen our defence of the truth. Also, the arbitrary can serve to fuel our imagination apart from cognition.
What value has the discussion brought so far?
Understanding that the only basic means of knowledge is grasping the self-evident and grasping what is self-evidently implicit in the self-evident, we see a clear basis for identifying (1) what does or does not amount to evidence and/or proof for claims, (2) what is a valid argument as opposed to an invalid or spurious argument and (3) what is certain as opposed to arbitrary. Furthermore, understanding that knowledge is relational is key to understanding how gaps in knowledge are identified, which is key to identifying uncertainty (i.e. probability, possibility and known unknowns).
Consider a factual context (i.e. a context drawn only from facts and logic) within which a particular claim is self-evidently implicit. In other words, the particular claim is knowledge. In such a case, the particular claim is certain, i.e. self-evidently implicit within the given factual context. Hence, certainty is the state of a claim within a factual context wherein the claim is self-evidently implicit within the context and thereby true, i.e. a fact of reality. A key point here is that the context must be factual for certainty to be possible. If the context is not factual, i.e. if it has assumptions that may or may not be true, then the certainty of a claim that is self-evidently implicit in the context is true if and only if the context turns out to be factual. However, even in such a case, certainty can be achieved in the form of a hypothetical, i.e. in the form: if X were true, then Y would certainly be true.
A key point clear in the previous section is that certainty, like knowledge, is contextual. The reason is clear: knowledge is contextual, saying a claim is “certain” means the claim is knowledge, therefore the qualification of the claim being “certain” is also contextual, i.e. based on the given factual context. Take an example. If a child generalises that balls roll on smooth surfaces, the generalisation is based only on the factual context that the child holds, whether or not the child can identify it. Then, the observation of a ball not rolling on a smooth surface due to, say, magnetism, does not mean the child was wrong to be certain before. He was right within his old factual context in which there was no knowledge of magnetism; he would in fact have been wrong to not be certain of his generalisation since that would contradict the fact that it was self-evidently implicit within his old factual context. The observation of the effect of magnetism only serves to expand his factual context, not to negate it; after all, reality is non-contradictory and thus no two factual contexts can contradict each other. Having made the new observation, the child now learns the conditions implicit in his old factual context and now knows with certainty that balls roll on smooth surfaces provided there is no effect of a newly discovered cause that he may later identify as magnetism.
Note a key point here: the certainty within the child’s old factual context was the only way in which the new observation would expand his factual context in terms of new relationships rather than in terms of new observations alone. Why? Before the new observation, if the child did not grasp that his generalisation was self-evidently implicit in his factual context, then the child would have no idea what his knowledge implied about the movement of balls on smooth surfaces. Then, upon seeing the new observation, since the child would have no idea about what his factual context implied about what he was observing, he would have no means of knowing that he was observing something outside his factual context. To him, it would seem that based on everything he already knew, balls could always get stuck in one place on a smooth surface and he was only seeing it for the first time. He would have no reason to explore the cause of the ball’s new behaviour because he would have no reason to think there was a new kind of cause involved.
Perhaps you think such a reaction is unrealistic, but I posit that you only think so because of how intuitive the generalisation here is. Consider a more complex case, such as your view of someone’s character. Suppose you are uncertain about whether someone is an intelligent person, and then, you catch him doing something stupid. Would you then want to investigate why he did it? Or would you take the new observation with a shrug and adjust your view of him? Now consider if you are certain about his intelligence, and then, you catch him doing something stupid. Here, his action would be clearly uncharacteristic of him and outside your factual context, which would tell you that there are other causal factors at play apart from his usual intellectual capabilities (maybe he was tired, or hit in the head, or trying something you did not understand, etc.). Going back to the example of the child, only if he knows with certainty that within his old factual context, balls do not get stuck in one place but always roll on a smooth surface, then the new observation would give him knowledge about a new kind of cause, i.e. it would show him that he is observing a phenomenon whose cause is unlike any cause he was previously aware of.
NOTE: To re-emphasise a key point, a broader context never contradicts a narrower one and vice versa. Hence, a child’s grasp of physics, if it is valid within his factual context, is never contradicted by the knowledge of a physicist. The reason is that, by the non-contradictory nature of reality and the relational (i.e. hierarchical and contextual) nature of knowledge, a broader context only reveals the conditions implicit in the narrower context and never negates it.
Summarising the points so far…
Only certainty shows you what your context implies (i.e. necessitates), thereby giving you the means to know when a new observation reveals the existence of new factors outside your factual context. Without certainty, new observations only give you new data that do not add to the essentials of your factual context. Hence, we see that certainty is implied by knowledge and greatly improves one’s efficacy in the pursuit of further knowledge. But we shall now see that certainty is not just present and useful but necessary for cognition, even for cognition in uncertainty.
The self-evident is certain in the sense that the self-evident is directly given by reality and inherent in one’s awareness of reality. However, it is a bit of a tautology to call the self-evident “certain”, since it is after all self-evident; it is the basis of knowledge and, by extension, certainty. Nonetheless, we observe that the expansion of knowledge from the self-evident is self-evidently possible and normal once we grasp how it is done: selective focus to bring to awareness what is self-evidently implicit in the self-evident. Hence, we see that certainty is also possible and normal from the most basic to the most advanced levels of cognition.
Now, note that the very fact of awareness gives rise to knowledge; if it did not, awareness would have to affirm nothing in reality, in which case it would hold nothing and thereby be unaware, i.e. not exist. Hence, knowledge presupposes any further awareness, including the awareness of one’s lack of knowledge is some respect. Hence, certainty also presupposes any further awareness, including the awareness of one’s lack of certainty, i.e. uncertainty.
To grasp it more clearly, consider what uncertainty means. To be uncertain about something is, in essence, to know that you do not know something. In other words, it is to be certain of the insufficiency in the evidence or in the quality of reasoning. Do you have to certain about such insufficiency to be uncertain? Consider if you were not certain of it. Then, you would not know whether or not the evidence or the quality of reasoning are insufficient or not. In other words, you would be certain of the insufficiency in your capacity and/or confidence in judging the evidence or the reasoning. Do you have to be certain about such insufficiency to be uncertain? We see clearly that if we keep going, we would eventually end up questioning the self-evident truths, truths which cannot properly be questioned since they are the basis of any questioning. Hence, we observe that pure skepticism (i.e. uncertainty about everything) leads eventually to the questioning of the self-evident, after which either we set aside skepticism to work with certainty or we turn our words and thoughts into meaningless noise.
NOTE: Uncertainty includes probability, possibility and known unknowns.
A key implication of the fact that uncertainty presupposes certainty is that every step of cognition leads to certainty, if only certainty about insufficiency in knowledge (e.g. insufficiency in evidence and reasoning, in our capacity to judge evidence and reasoning, etc.). To know what we do not know, we have to know, i.e. be certain of the facts that reveal the limits of our knowledge. For example, to know that there is a chance of failure in an airplane, we must be certain of the fact that in real-life environments, there exist factors that cannot be accounted for. As another example, to know that there is a chance of an asteroid strike on Earth, we must be certain of the fact that asteroids can and do strike other bodies in space such as Earth. As a negative example, we cannot know if there is a chance for pink unicorns to prance down the street since nothing in our knowledge points to the existence of such creatures (even to validly claim possibility, we must know something, i.e. have at least some evidence).
Concluding remarks…
Efficacy in dealing with reality is impossible without certainty or at least the pursuit of certainty in higher levels (presupposing certainty in at least some lower level). Certainty is the goal of cognition and is always possible, desirable and necessary in some way and on some level.
NOTE: By efficacy, I mean efficacy in every sense: moral, cognitive, practical, etc. Note also that every form of efficacy is necessarily tied to the others; all forms are essentially aspects of efficacy as such.
We observe that we know something, but we also observe that our knowledge is finite since our consciousness as well as the amount we can observe and integrate up to a certain point are finite. Moreover, we observe that there exist things outside our current factual context; we can observe this by reaching at least some certainty in what our current factual context implies and — by extension — does not imply. In other words, we know that we do not know everything.
Now, consider the case of learning about something in particular whose nature is unknown (it can be anything: an object, an animal, a person, an environment, etc.). Knowledge is relational, but direct awareness does not automatically give us knowledge about the relationships between the facts we observe and the other facts we know. Furthermore, we are not necessarily certain that we have observed everything there is to observe; if we are ignorant, then as we come to know more, we can observe clearly that we do not know beyond a certain point and often also what we do not know beyond a certain point. Hence, our knowledge of what we are learning about does not necessarily go directly from ignorance to certainty; there are in-between stages in our knowledge wherein we have some knowledge of what we learning about as well as some knowledge of what we know and do not know.
In other words, we often have degrees of uncertainty between ignorance and certainty. A key question in cognition, therefore, is: how to move from ignorance to certainty? What is the nature of the new observations and knowledge that move us in that direction? Hence, we see that it is useful to identify that which decreases our uncertainty about something. We identify it by the concept of “evidence”. More precisely, evidence about an object of focus is any observation or knowledge that either gives us certainty or decreases our uncertainty about the object of focus.
NOTE: It is invalid to say “increase” or “decrease” for certainty, since certainty identifies the end state of cognition wherein we have knowledge as opposed to its absence. Certainty is either-or: either you are certain or not. You cannot be “more certain” or “less certain”, only certain.
The most basic form of evidence is self-evidence. Though I have discussed it at length, I shall look into it with respect to higher forms of knowledge in order to address the proper use and the potential misuse of the idea of self-evidence. Having dealt with that, I shall move on to understand what counts as evidence apart from self-evidence, i.e. what makes new observations or knowledge evidence as opposed to irrelevant considerations.
NOTE: Saying “observations” and “knowledge” together is redundant, since observations are a form of knowledge. However, I wanted to emphasise the need to use both direct awareness, i.e. observation, and the knowledge derived therefrom.
LEXICAL NOTE:
I want to explicitly distinguish between my use of the terms “self-evidence” and “implicit self-evidence”. In other words, I want to explicitly distinguish between non-volitional, i.e. automatic cognition and volitional, i.e. non-automatic cognition; such a distinction is important since volition is the basis of purposeful cognition beyond the perceptual level. “Self-evidence” as such refers to that which needs no volitionally-driven selective focus to grasp, i.e. it is grasped automatically. “Implicit self-evidence” on the other hand refers to that which becomes self-evident only through volitionally-driven selective focus, i.e. it is not reached automatically, though once it is reached, grasping it is automatic. It can be said that the implicitly self-evident is that which is self-evident if and only if it is subjected volitionally to the right selective focus.
Now that we have seen how higher forms of knowledge (i.e. knowledge beyond direct awareness) are reached and how they tie into the concept of certainty, I want to now step back and look further into the basis of certainty: self-evidence. I want to do so because of two reasons: (1) people make claims of self-evidence about higher forms of knowledge such as concepts, generalisations and principles (e.g. the pre-Socratic idea that “change needs contradiction”, Plato’s idea of concept-formation being essentially the “self-evident” revelation of “forms” to a select few, the idea that some moral principles are innate and thus “self-evident”, bad generalisations such as “the heat of the sun is caused by its position in the sky”, the guilt or innocence of a person being “self-evident” based on “intuition” and/or circumstantial evidence, extrasensory entities such as spirits or God being “self-evident” based on “demonstrations”, etc.), and (2) people speak of “self-evidence” as “faith” (e.g. “reason is based on axioms of faith”, “you have faith in the fact that your senses tell you the truth”, etc.). Now, note that (a) self-evidence is the starting point of knowledge, (b) higher forms of knowledge cannot by their nature be self-evident, and (c) the concept of “faith” is not the same as the concept of “direct observation”. Therefore, I want to explore the nature of self-evidence and understand what really is self-evident, what does it really tell us and what kinds of knowledge can or cannot be self-evident.
Self-evidence is one’s direct awareness of reality. Direct awareness is the grasp of that which is given directly by reality. Now, note that all of reality is open to awareness and as such, i.e. reality gives you everything about itself, the only filter being the finite capacity of your direct awareness and the direction of your focus. Hence, what self-evidence tells us is that existence exists and that something exists and it is what it is. What it is, is up to our cognition to discover, but self-evidence only tells you that it is something in particular, this thing as opposed to that thing.
The nature of what the self-evident tells us…
Already, we see that calling the self-evident “true” is a kind of tautology, since the self-evident is the basis of truth. We also see that the self-evident is inescapable to awareness; if you are aware and turn your awareness toward it, you cannot but affirm it. Hence, a way to show that something is self-evident is to show how even denying it leads to its affirmation. For example, if I see something in front of me and deny that it exists, I am saying, in effect, “What I am seeing is not what it is.” You might say that what I mean when I deny the existence of something is, “What I am seeing is not what I think I am seeing.” But note that here, I am speaking of self-evidence and not interpretation, i.e. I am speaking of a pre-conceptual level of cognition. Self-evidence does not tell you what you are seeing, only that you are seeing and that you are seeing something in particular as opposed to something else. Hence, when denying the existence of something I perceive as it is, I deny that the thing exists and is what it is, thereby denying the fact that I am aware, since if the thing is not what it is and thus does not exist, I cannot be aware of it. Needless to say, such a position denies the very fact of my awareness of something and makes anything I say about it mere noise.
NOTE: Even if what you perceive is a hallucination, it is still something and is a part of reality that you can be aware of, which in this case is your mental condition. This is made clear by the fact that we can identify, correct for and treat hallucinations. Whatever they are, they are something particular in reality and have particular real effects.
Hence, it is important to see how basic the material of self-evidence really is so that we do not grant the automatically absolute status of “self-evident” to knowledge that must be reached through non-automatic, i.e. fallible means. Self-evidence forms the basis of knowledge such that implicit in it is everything that we know and can know. However, just by itself, it gives us the barest amount of knowledge which we can and must integrate through selective focus, abstraction and reasoning.
NOTE: Fallibility does not mean that certainty beyond the self-evident is impossible, only that certainty beyond the self-evident is not automatic.
LEXICAL NOTE:
When I say “idea”, I am referring to any product of abstraction, e.g. concept, generalisation, principle, theory, etc. When I say “revelation”, I am referring to an idea that is considered self-evident, i.e. considered automatically true by itself (i.e. intrinsically) or by mere direct awareness of it or by the mere presence of it in the mind. Hence, I am using the term “revelation” as a generalisation of the notions of “innate ideas”, “intuition as knowledge” and “faith as truth”. Just to be clear, note that I regard intuition as a valid means to facilitate reason and not to replace it, whereas the concept of “intuition as knowledge” is the concept of intuition as being sufficient for knowledge.
Consider the notion of an abstraction, such as a concept, generalisation or principle, that is grasped by the mind directly without a process of reason. What does it mean? It means that the abstraction was a product not of selective focus but of direct awareness, i.e. direct perception of reality. Let us first examine this using the example of a concept. Now, note that a concept is, in essence, a relationship between units (concrete or abstract) wherein one group of units is at once tied to units inside the group and separated from units outside the group through the selective focus on one or more distinguishing similarities. Hence, to grasp a concept is to grasp the concretes in question as well as their relationships to each other.
Now, consider: how do you validate a concept? For the moment, set aside the distinction between observed and unobserved units and note what it takes for a concept to be validated as an integration of a group of units. Evidently, we must show that the units are tied to each other by distinguishing similarities. But direct awareness is not automatically selective (beyond the selectivity inherent in the finite capacity of consciousness), which means we must apply our selective focus to grasp the distinguishing similarities. Hence, a concept cannot be automatically valid; it has to validated through our non-automatic selective focus. We can extend the same reasoning to any abstraction, since any abstraction is a product of selective focus that relates two or more units, which means it can only be validated by grasping the relationship through selective focus. Hence, even if an idea were directly beamed into your head, you would have no grasp of its validity without taking the steps to selectively focus on each aspect of it that gives rise to it. Hence, there are no ideas that are automatically valid just by virtue of being in the mind.
“Revelation” ignores the need for abstraction…
Direct awareness is the grasp of that which is given directly by reality, but reality as such gives you everything about itself, the only filter being the finite capacity of your direct awareness and the direction of your focus. The fact that consciousness is finite is what gives rise to the need for abstraction, and the fact that focus can be directed is what gives rise to the potential for abstraction. To illustrate my point, consider two kinds of beings. One kind can directly perceive up to 100 dots at once, while another being can directly perceive only up to 10. The existence of 50 dots can be grasped by the first being by direct perception, whereas for the second being, it can only grasp the 50 dots by means of numbers abstracted from the quantities it can directly perceive (1-10). Both kinds of beings grasp the same fact of reality objectively, but one grasps it by direct perception while the other grasps it by integrating its perception via selective focus and abstraction. Of course, this is how we humans can grasp and deal with numbers as large as a thousand or a million despite never being able to recognise them by direct awareness. Hence, abstractions are our means of extending the range of our cognition beyond what we can directly be aware of at any given moment, which makes it even clearer why they cannot be validated by direct awareness alone.
A key implication of the above discussion (that ties into what I said about knowledge) is that beyond the self-evident, we can only know more by selectively focusing on, interrelating and integrating two or more concretes. Hence, no higher form of knowledge can be self-evident, i.e. automatically valid just by virtue of us being aware of its presence in our minds. We thereby invalidate the ancient idea (dating back at least to Parmenides) that being able to think of something means it must exist. Even if “knowledge” were beamed directly into your brain, you would not get any knowledge from it without first seeing the self-evident truths on which it rests and the logic therefrom.
Hence, a key point about the nature of higher-level knowledge…
All knowledge beyond basic observation is the integration of basic observations. All knowledge, from the most basic perceptions to the most esoteric abstractions, are essentially the same two processes of cognition: the grasp of the self-evident and selective focus therefrom. Of course, the complexity and the exact process of integration can differ, but the epistemological basis is the same.
Since uncertainty is only identified with respect to what we know, i.e. what we are certain of, and since knowledge of reality and — by extension — certainty is the goal of cognition, evidence can only be identified with respect to the meaning of certainty in the given context. Hence, note that just as with certainty, evidence is also contextual, i.e. based on the factual context in question.
Hence, to identify evidence for the given context, we must identify what constitutes certainty in the given context, i.e. what constitutes the standard of proof. Before explaining myself further, let me first define the term: standard of proof refers to that which is the fundamental condition for a proposition to be true. What does this mean and why have I defined it in this way? Let us begin with the concept of a “fundamental feature”. The fundamental feature of X is a feature or set of features that necessitates and is necessitated by every distinguishing characteristic of X in the given context, i.e. it is both necessary and sufficient to the existence of every distinguishing characteristic of X in the given context (the reason for defining “fundamental” in this way is given in the notes after the next few paragraphs). For example, the fundamental feature of sugar in the context of groceries consists of its sweetening properties and its granularity. As another example, the fundamental feature of a human being in the context of creatures known thus far is the capacity for reason.
Note that a context in cognition is always purposeful, i.e. it always relates to our efficacy in dealing with reality according to our values. Hence, a fundamental feature of X is the feature or set of features that would be both necessary and sufficient to know in order to achieve our purpose when dealing with X. For example, in the context of creatures known thus far, our purpose is to understand how to interact with them. Should we fear them or not? Force them to do our bidding or respect their autonomy? And so on. The feature of rationality, when tied to day-to-day experience, is the feature that is both necessary and sufficient to understand the essentials of how to treat people as opposed to other animals (i.e. we can speak and reason with each other and be understood, we must have mutual respect for each other’s autonomy, we can work and trade with each other, etc.).
Hence, when asking what is the fundamental condition for a proposition to be true, we are asking, in essence, what is both necessary and sufficient to achieve certainty about the proposition within our context. In other words, we are asking what is the condition or set of conditions that together necessitates and is necessitated by the distinguishing characteristics of the potential truth of the proposition within our context. In other words, we ask: what is the fundamental feature that would differentiate the potential truth of the proposition from its potential falsehood, i.e. what is the fundamental difference between the proposition turning out true and the proposition turning out false?
NOTE 1: Fundamental condition as either simple or composite:
I have defined “fundamental condition” in broad enough terms such that it covers any kind of condition or combination of conditions, including a disjunction (i.e. a composite condition in the form: A or B or C etc.), a conjunction (i.e. a composite condition in the form: A and B and C etc.) or any more complex system of interrelated conditions. Whatever is fundamental to the truth of a proposition is its fundamental condition. Such a broad yet precise definition makes it easy to generalise while also making it easy to state and effectively apply.
NOTE 2: Why define “fundamental” as “both necessary and sufficient”?
Consider: what is necessary but not sufficient for X is not enough to prove X, hence cannot by itself be the standard of proof, whereas what is sufficient for X presupposes everything that is necessary for X but may involve optional factors, i.e. factors that are not necessary for X. Hence, we see that a sufficient condition is necessarily either both necessary and sufficient for X or presupposes what is both necessary and sufficient for X. But since a sufficient condition may involve optional factors that are not relevant to X, having a condition that is sufficient but not necessary means we may take irrelevant factors as parts of the standard of proof. By doing so, we degrade our efficacy in dealing with reality since we treat the non-essential as the essential. Such an approach can cause much loss and/or harm due to: (1) wasting valuable time and effort trying to seek non-essential factors, (2) losing values and potential values since you cannot recognise them without the non-essential factors (which may be absent often or even most of the time), (3) not recognising threats or potential threats without the non-essential factors (which may be absent often or even most of the time), etc. Hence, for the sake of rationality and efficacy, I define “fundamental” as “both necessary and sufficient” rather than just “sufficient”. It goes without saying that a sufficient condition for X is sufficient to prove X, but for the reasons mentioned, it cannot be the standard by which we can validly identify and evaluate evidence.
As an example, suppose I want to know how likely I am to have a road accident right now. To understand my uncertainty, I have to understand what it would take for me to be certain of it. Hence, I ask: what is the fundamental difference between the case where a road accident is going to occur and the case where it is not? Hence, we must grasp the necessary and sufficient conditions for a road accident to occur. What do we know? (1) We must be on the road or at least beside the road, i.e. reachable by a vehicle that either is on its path or veers off its path. (2) We must be set to collide with a road vehicle and unable move out of the way in time. Assuming that these are the only conditions that together make up the fundamental condition, we can then look for more information that makes each condition less uncertain, i.e. we break down each condition into their own fundamentals. For example, we see that the fundamental conditions for condition (2) are: (a) We are in the path of collision. (b) We have no capacity to react in time. Now, based on how closely each condition is met, we can decide how likely the outcome would be. For example, if we driving a car at a high speed down a road, we know two things: (a) We very close to the path of collision with other vehicles; since we know there is a potential for small deviations due to driver error, and since small deviations are enough to put us on a collision path, we know there is a potential for collision due to driver error. (b) We are less capable of avoiding collisions due to our relatively high speed and relatively low reaction time. Hence, putting these factors together, I know that I am more likely to have road accident while driving a car at a high speed down a road than while walking on the pavement or while sitting at home (where there is no possibility at all within my factual context).
NOTE: The degree of probability for something is not the same as the degree of uncertainty about it. Rather, to put it in mathematical terms, uncertainty refers to how much you know about the probability distribution of the possible outcomes. Hence, when we are wholly uncertain about something, every outcome is as likely in our knowledge. The more we know about which outcome is less or more likely compared to the other outcomes, the less uncertainty we have.
We see that only if we know what it takes to be certain about something can we know how uncertain we are about it, at least in relative terms. Evidence for a proposition, then, is any observation or knowledge that shows the satisfaction of some part of the fundamental condition for the proposition being true, either directly or indirectly (i.e. by satisfying some part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions that tie the primary fundamental condition to more particular facts). For example, in the case of learning the likelihood of a road accident, the fact that we are driving a car at a high speed down a road is a piece of evidence that supports the proposition that we are more likely to have road accident. As another example, consider the case of verifying the authorship of a work, where the fundamental condition for a work being the author’s own is the causal relationship between the author’s own efforts and the work’s creation. Here, there is reason to say that the style of writing is one of the unique effects of the author’s own efforts (at least within the factual context that implies that the author’s style is consistent across his writing). Here, then, the similarity between the style of the work and the author’s other works is a piece of evidence supporting the proposition that the work in question is the author’s own work.
NOTE: Evidently, the fundamental condition has to be as broad as the context so as to cover everything within the context. For example, if we are considering the fundamental condition for the general likelihood of a road accident, then we must generalise a broader variety of specific factors (e.g. design and quality of the roads, potential environmental factors, etc.). On the other hand, if we are considering the same for a more specific context, such as the likelihood of a drunk driver getting into an accident, then our fundamental condition takes some of the more specific factors into account as well, e.g. the effects of inebriation.
Putting the points together…
The standard of proof for a proposition is defined based on the fundamental condition for the proposition to be true within the given factual context. Evidence for the proposition can only be identified with respect to the standard of proof, even if we have only some knowledge of the standard. Hence, something that is not a known factor in the satisfaction of the fundamental condition cannot be evidence for the proposition in question. Here, it is key to note that anything whose effect on the truth of the proposition is outside our factual context, i.e. outside our knowledge cannot be evidence since it does not relate to the standard of proof, i.e. to the means of achieving certainty within our factual context.
For example, the possibility of a meteorite striking the road is outside our factual context and thus cannot be evidence for a higher probability of a road accident. Yes, meteorites do strike the Earth, but we have no means of taking its likelihood into account since we have no knowledge (in our day-to-day factual context) about what makes a meteorite strike less or more likely. As another example, the author’s hatred of bees is not a causal factor in the lack of mention of bees in his work because nothing in our factual context shows the causal relationship; hating bees does not mean you do not write about them — you may even write at great length against them — and not writing about bees does not necessarily arise from your hatred of them. In both the examples, the given facts are non-factors within our factual context because they do not relate to the standard of proof, which means their effect or potential effect on the truth of the given proposition is outside the factual context.
The above discussion leads us to the topic to be discussed later: evidence vs. the irrelevant…
A factual context in a given situation consists of everything you know and can hold within your focus effectively in the given situation. Hence, your factual context what you know you do not know, i.e. what you know to be outside your factual context. For example, if I know I do not know about, say, the weather on Mars, that knowledge is outside my factual context, though the knowledge that I do not know it is within my factual context. Your factual context also includes what you know to be important or potentially important and thus relevant to learn. If you have no knowledge about how to learn something, its consideration is outside your factual context. If you have no knowledge about whether something is important or potentially important, then its importance or potential importance is outside your factual context, which means it is not relevant to learn. Note that relevance is always with respect to what you know, which is why saying “relevant within your knowledge” is redundant.
Relevance as key to the factual context…
Since rationality demands relevance (see: “Relevance is key to consistent rationality” from Consistency in Rationality from Rationality in Practice from Epistemology), the factual context for a given case must consist only of what is known to be necessary to the cognitive purpose. For example, when studying bacteria, I have no reason to think that the knowledge of set theory (among other things) is necessary to understand the life cycle and behaviour of bacteria, so I do not keep it in my factual context. On the other hand, I know that cellular biology and perhaps organic chemistry are necessary for the same, so these go into my factual context.
It is easy to dismiss false factors once recognised due to the contradictions, but it may be harder to recognise and dismiss the irrelevant since they do not contradict what is known and may often seem plausible. For example, one may point to a mention of a flying machine in an ancient source as evidence of an advanced civilisation from ancient times. As another example, one may take a medium narrating a dead person’s personal stories as evidence that the medium is in fact talking to the dead. As another example, one may hear anecdotes of people “remembering” things they had no means of knowing and take these anecdotes as evidence for reincarnation. Do these count as evidence?
As seen previously, to identify evidence, we must identify a standard of proof within a factual context; evidence can exist neither out of context nor apart from the standard of proof. Hence, something that we have no way of knowing in our factual context is detached from our factual context (i.e. arbitrary) and obviously cannot be evidence. Less obviously, a fact that does not serve to satisfy at least a part of the standard of proof cannot be evidence. Thirdly, since evidence is only possible with respect to a standard of proof, where no standard of proof exists, there evidence neither exists nor can exist; in such a case, every fact is irrelevant to proving the proposition in question. For example, there can be no evidence for something ineffable such as “extrasensory entities”, “extradimensional beings” or “God”.
However, given that there is a standard of proof, how to identify whether a fact does or does not satisfy at least a part of the standard of proof? Let me illustrate the problem with an example. Suppose you want to know if it is going to rain today. Here are some facts that may or may not relate to rain: the presence of grey clouds, the humidity, the time of the year, the geographical location, the overall temperature, the wind speed, etc. What counts as evidence and what is irrelevant? What facts would or would not serve to satisfy the standard of proof for the occurrence of rain, i.e. what facts would or would not be parts of the standard of proof?
To understand what is or is not a part of the standard of proof, we must first understand how the standard of proof for a proposition is defined. Previously, we have defined it as the fundamental condition for the truth of the proposition, where the fundamental condition is defined as both the necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition within the factual context. Now, note that rationality demands efficiency (see: Efficiency and Rationality from Rationality in Practice from Epistemology), which means a key purpose of the concept of “fundamental condition” is to make our pursuit of truth efficient and thereby rational. Hence, the fundamental condition is the least number of necessary conditions that are together sufficient to prove the proposition. Any more, and we waste our time and effort on non-essentials. Any less, and we miss key facts that are needed to prove or at least evidence the proposition. In both cases, we are losing our ties with reality, in the first case because of negligence by overload and in the second case because of negligence by omission. Hence, a fact is evidence if and only if it relates to the most essential conditions for the proof in the given factual context.
NOTE: The effect of considering non-essentials on one’s efficacy:
Remember that consciousness is finite, and turning our focus toward that whose importance or potential importance is unknown means turning our focus away from that whose importance or potential importance is known. By focusing on the non-essentials, we direct our focus not based on knowledge but on ignorance, which is akin to looking one way and walking another. We turn not to awareness but to unawareness and thereby turn away from reality as a policy. We may be lucky and get something out of it, but in adopting such a practice, we degrade our capacity to live and pursue values, especially long-range. Remember: reality is integrated by identity and causality and thus can and must be understood by awareness. Turning away from it can never give you the efficacy of awareness and reason.
Let us expand on the last point before the note. By reason, each part of the fundamental condition can have its own fundamental condition, i.e. its own standard of proof. By using the hierarchy of fundamental conditions, we can identify whether a given fact is a part of the hierarchy or not and thereby evidence or not. Furthermore, by identifying what part of the hierarchy the evidence is a part of, we can identify how relatively weak or strong it is compared to other evidence. Note that evidence is always with respect to our factual context, which means if the relationship between a fact and our hierarchy of fundamental conditions is outside our factual context, then it cannot be evidence. Also, I think it goes without saying that when I talk about “evidence” by itself, I am talk about evidence for something in particular (for a given proposition, in our case).
NOTE: Remember that the purpose of the concept of “evidence” is to move our cognition toward certainty, which is not achieved by adding arbitrary unknowns. Assuming that something “may turn out to be evidence” even if we have no basis to think so goes against the very purpose of evidence and is therefore an irrational assumption, especially since the arbitrary serves to separate our cognition from reality and thereby degrade or destroy our capacity to deal with reality.
What happens if we consider a necessary but insufficient condition of the truth of the proposition (i.e. a condition that is necessarily true if the proposition is true) that is also not part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions? For convenience, let T be the case where the proposition holds true. Now, note that the overarching fundamental condition by its nature integrates (i.e. necessitates and is necessitated by) everything in the factual context that relates to T. Hence, every fact that integrates a part of T not integrated by the other facts is necessarily a part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions. Hence, a necessary but insufficient condition for T — let us call it K — that is not part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions is already integrated by at least some part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions. Furthermore, what K integrates is no more than what is already integrated by at least some part of the hierarchy of fundamental conditions. Hence, K by itself tells us nothing necessary to prove T and is therefore not evidence for T.
For example, consider the case of a medium narrating a dead person’s personal stories. The medium being able to do this is a necessary consequence of him being able to talk to dead people, if it were indeed true that he could. So, is this evidence that he is talking to dead people? Consider: what is the standard of proof to show that dead people can even exist beyond the grave? In our knowledge, we have no basis to think that a consciousness can exist apart from the body or in “another dimension” (if it even exists, whatever it means). These ideas have no basis in our knowledge of reality and are necessarily floating abstractions. Making at least one of them concrete would be a step toward the proof. Secondly, since information can be gained in many ways and we have no knowledge about how it was gained in the case at hand, we have no basis to make any connection between the information gained and the source of the information. Hence, another part of the proof would be to show that the information was in fact gained apart from a physical source. In truth, despite these conditions not even being enough as a standard of proof for the proposition, none of these conditions can be logically or causally related by our knowledge to the fact that the medium knows a dead person’s personal stories. Hence, in our factual context, the medium’s “demonstration” is irrelevant, i.e. it is not evidence for the proposition that he can in fact talk to dead people.