CONCEPTUAL CLARITY
Contents:
Contextual clarity refers to the clear grasp of the context (i.e. the sum of interrelated facts) that conditions the meaning of a given conscious unit. For example, the context of the concept of “automobile” (a bit oversimplified for the example) consists of (1) one’s concrete observations of various living and non-living moving objects, (2) one’s grasp of machinery and its distinction from living beings, (3) one’s grasp of powered mechanical motion and locomotion, (4) one’s concepts of various kinds of locomotive vehicles of which an automobile is one kind, etc. As another example, the context of the idea of “trade” (a bit oversimplified for the example) consists of (1) one’s distinction between the natures of animals and humans, (2) one’s grasp of the fact that individual capacities differ and that time and effort is finite and cannot be spent on everything one needs or wants, (3) one’s grasp of the benefit of exchange of values between humans, (4) one’s grasp of the distinction between an exchange done voluntarily versus involuntarily, etc.
Without context, “automobile” and “trade” are floating abstractions, i.e. conscious units detached from our grasp of reality, existing as if they were perceptual units rather than an integrated grasp of one’s actual perception of reality. Furthermore, in the wrong context, i.e. the context apart from the one that gives rise to an abstraction, the abstraction either takes on a meaning that may or may not be supported by reality (thereby becoming essentially floating) or merges with another abstraction that has another meaning that perhaps contradicts the meaning of the original abstraction. For example, if we omit the aspect of voluntary exchange in trade, the idea of “trade” becomes indistinguishable from “extortion” or (in some contexts such as the labour market) “exploitation”. Such an equivocation destroys the essence of “trade” and thereby destroys our ability to deal with value-exchange in a consistently constructive way (since we confuse the constructive way with the destructive way).
Hence, we see the hints of the answer to the question: why preserve the meaning of abstractions, i.e. why care about contextual clarity? Moreover, what is the harm in dropping or confusing certain abstractions? To answer, we must understand the importance of abstractions. Metaphysically, only concretes exist. However, since reality is identifiable, non-contradictory and causal, concretes are things in particular and exist, act and react neither in isolation nor in contradiction to the facts. In other words, concretes always exist in particular relationships to other concretes based on identity and causality. Examples of such relationships between concretes are: their similarities and differences to each other, their effects on each other over time, their ability or inability to coexist in the same place and/or in the same time, etc. For example, we observe that red and green cannot exist in the same place, at the same time and when viewed from the same perspective. As another example, we observe that winds blow lighter objects more strongly than heavier ones. As another example, we observe that the heartbeat of a living being is the cause of its blood circulation.
To put it broadly, reality is a sum integrated by identity and causality. Hence, to understand the nature of any part of reality, we must understand its logical relationship to other parts of reality. In other words, we must grasp an integrated context of facts to understand the significance of any one fact. Now, note that abstractions are the selective focus of facts in reality, which helps bring to focus what is implicit in what we directly perceive. For example, we can selectively focus on the essential characteristics of a tree, namely its structure, size and its tendency to grow and spread toward sunlight. By selectively focusing on the essentials and omitting the concrete details that may vary (e.g. the shape of the leaves, the exact arrangement of the branches, the exact environment in which it stands, etc.), we can identify a new concrete as either a tree or not a tree and, if it is a tree, we can thereby know something about its nature without observing everything about it from scratch. In other words, we can identify what is implicit in our perception of a new tree by focusing on selected aspects of our observations of other trees and relating that selective focus to the selective focus on the new observation. Note that awareness is the only way to grasp reality, which means selective focus (i.e. directed awareness) is the only way to grasp parts or aspects of our awareness of reality (e.g. components, attributes, causal relationships, etc.), which means selective focus is the only way to grasp some parts of reality in relation to other parts of reality.
Hence, we see that abstraction is our fundamental means of grasping an integrated context whose scope exceeds the scope of our direct awareness of reality in the moment. Since awareness is finite while the scope of reality far exceeds our direct awareness of it, abstraction is our only means to know not only what we see but also the nature of what we see, thereby giving us the means to act effectively (especially in the long-range) according to what we see. Now, given the importance of abstraction and given the fact that everything in reality exists within a particular context, i.e. in particular relationships to other things in reality, we can see that preserving the context of an abstraction is the only way to preserve its importance, i.e. it is the only way to make sure it refers to reality and thereby helps us act effectively in reality. Hence, to put it starkly, contextual clarity is at its core a matter of life and death; to deal with reality effectively, we must grasp and preserve the context of the conscious units that are meant to refer to parts or aspects of reality.
To re-emphasise the last point in another way…
Understanding how something relates to the rest of reality (as far as it affects us) is key to understanding how it exists, acts and interacts in reality (as far as it affects us in our pursuit of values). The right context is that which relates something to everything in reality that affects us in our pursuit of values. Hence, we see that nothing can be understood as part of reality or a potential part of reality without understanding the context in which it exists or would exist. Reality is integrated by identity and causality, which is why to understand reality, we must also integrate our knowledge of it by identity and causality, i.e. by observing similarities and differences and discovering logical and causal relationships. Evidently, the effective pursuit of values needs the right integration, and the right integration needs the right context.
A context is a finite set of facts that exist in logical and/or causal relationships with each other. One context is said to be broader than another if the one integrates every fact in the other and more. In my understanding, two contexts wherein neither one subsumes the other cannot be compared in breadth, because there is no objective basis for comparison. On the other hand, if one context subsumes another, it is clear that the latter is a subset of the former.
Now, note that causality says that everything acts according to its identity, i.e. its nature. Hence, if things exist in logical and/or causal relationships to each other, then key to their identity and thus their actions are such logical and/or causal relationships. Evidently, then, a broader context (1) implies more about the nature of something than a narrower one, (2) implies the natures of more things (note that the nature of a thing also consists of its behaviour) and (3) implies the relationships between more things. However, due to non-contradiction, neither context can contradict each other. Hence, the facts, conditions, and/or explanations revealed in a broader context are never in contradiction to a narrower context, and the fact that these facts, conditions and/or explanations cannot be grasped in a narrower context does not mean they are not real; after all, what is, is, which means the fact that a broader context exists is a given that cannot be denied by any narrower context.
NOTE: I say that a broader context “implies” rather than “reveals”, because a broader context is usually grasped through broader abstractions and/or broader generalisations that omit many details; note that detail-omission is necessary due to (1) the finite capacity of consciousness, and (2) the need to focus on relevant (i.e. purpose-related) essentials. After all, abstractions and generalisations can only integrate many specifics by retaining essential similarities while omitting the differences.
Hence, contexts exist in a logical and causal hierarchy, i.e. they exist such that the nature of the facts in a narrower context are conditioned both logically (i.e. with respect to identity) and causally (i.e. with respect to actions, reactions and interactions) by facts in a broader context. Understanding this fact is crucial in understanding and validating concepts and generalisations, which together are the key to cognition beyond direct perception.
For example, consider the question: “Why is murder wrong? Where can I observe the ‘wrongness’ in the event of a murder?” Such a question assumes that moral judgement depends on a narrow perceptual context, similar to first-level concepts such as “tree” or “dog”. However, in fact, moral judgement integrates a far broader context of facts, including: the concept of concrete values, the most basic of which are grasped by the pleasure-pain mechanism, the concept of purpose, the source of any value and purpose being life, the nature of human life as a volitional being, the standard of value by which every other value and purpose exist, the proper relationship between volitional beings, the effect (both short-term and long-term) of violating one’s values, the need for striving for the greatest potential one can grasp and hence the need for moral perfection, etc. The concepts of “right” and “wrong” in morality have expressions in narrower context, but their expressions cannot be identified as an example of a broader truth without grasping the broader context.
To clarify my point, consider another example: “Where is the ‘tree-ness’ in an apple seed?” We grasp the fact that a seed grows into an apple by observing and integrating many facts over a long period of time, such as: the existence of a seed in an apple, the seed being on/in the soil, a sprout emerging from a seed (provided we observe it), the growth of the sprout into sapling and then a tree, the bearing of fruit of the same kind as the one the seed was from, etc. Even if someone could project the growth of a seed into a tree in the right conditions, the projection would still be based on a variety of facts derived from the initial causes and conditions, based on which the end result could be predicted. Hence, just as it is invalid to reject that seeds grow into trees on the basis that there is no “tree-ness” in a seed, so it is invalid to reject that murder is not wrong on the basis that there is no “wrongness” in an event of murder.
Since the basis of contextual clarity is holding the right context, all fallacies leading to contextual unclarity are types of the same one fallacy: context-dropping (“context-dropping” was a fallacy identified by Ayn Rand; see: Context-dropping). In essence, context-dropping is the fallacy of detaching a conscious unit from the context that validates it, i.e. disregarding the relationships to the facts that tie the idea to reality. We shall look at context-dropping from the most basic level, i.e. context-dropping in self-evidence, then work our way to context-dropping at higher levels of integration.
This the fallacy of regarding the truth of a conscious unit as self-evident when the referent of the conscious unit is not inherent in one’s direct awareness of reality. The reason why it is a fallacy is made clear in “Self-evidence with respect to higher knowledge” from Knowledge and Certainty. In short, it gives the automatically validated status of “self-evident” to that which can only be validated non-automatically; it is hence a rejection of reason and reality.
This is the fallacy of retaining an end result of concept-formation without retaining its connection to concretes. The reason it is a fallacy is clear: any abstraction draws its meaning only from a particular context, ultimately tied to particular (though potentially infinite) concretes. An abstraction says nothing and has no practical applicability if not tied to the concretes it draws from, which means working with floating abstractions is a symbolic puzzle rather than actual cognition of facts.
NOTE: Even when the concept seems clear in definition, as long as it is not tied to and reducible (by yourself) to concretes and concrete contexts, it stays floating.
This is the fallacy of forming an abstraction based on arbitrary criteria not based on any clear cognitive purpose. Why is purpose important? Purpose is essentially the orientation of an entity to act in a self-driven way toward a particular potential. Hence, note that there is no cognition without purpose; how can you act to gain any particular knowledge if you cannot orient yourself to gaining anything in particular? Hence, purposeless cognition is contradiction: it is to act to gain some knowledge without acting to gain that knowledge. Even if we grant the existence of cognition without purpose, such “cognition” would be identical to marking without meaning, i.e. meaningless effects of reality on your being; you might as well say that the mud “gains knowledge” of the rain hitting it or that the rock “gains knowledge” of the chisel carving it. If you care to exist like the mud or the rock insofar as you can exist in such a state, then sure, you can have “cognition” without purpose, at which point “cognition” loses its meaning. But if you care to live, then cognition is and must be purposeful; to the extent that mental effort is not purposeful, to that extent it does not result in cognition. To put it starkly, “knowledge” without a purposeful mind is nothing more than the effects of reality on a passive entity.
Now, note that to drop the purpose of an abstraction is to drop purpose in cognition. Hence, a purposeless abstraction is as good as nothing, i.e. it has no cognitive value. Since concept-formation is the basis for further abstraction, purposeless abstraction begins with taking definitions of concepts for granted without making sure they are useful within our context. For example, when arguing against free will, a person may use a supernaturalistic definition of free will that does not serve the purpose of referring to the natural process by which we direct our focus. By not seeing what purpose the concept of “free will” should serve, the person may come to accept the other side of the false dichotomy of “supernatural free will vs. natural determinism”.
As another example, consider the distinction of “objectivity vs. subjectivity” being defined as “the contents in reality in and of itself, i.e. apart from consciousness vs. the contents held within consciousness”. The distinction serves no purpose in understanding the right epistemological approach, since it makes no distinction between the conscious units that correspond to reality and the ones that do not. Moreover, what cognitive purpose does the concept of “the contents of reality in and of itself” serve apart from the concept of “reality”? Based on our useless definitions, if we reach the view that “objectivity is impossible” and “all knowledge is subjective”, we fail to distinguish between the conscious units the help us deal with reality as it is and the ones that do not, thereby paralysing our pursuit of knowledge and efficacy in dealing with reality by making us either doubtful about everything or certain without reason.
Further note on universal doubt vs. certainty without reason to show their consequences…
What are the consequences of each of the above two positions? The consequences of the former: lack of conviction, lack of efficacy in the pursuit of knowledge, lack of motivation toward the pursuit of truth and efficacy, etc. The consequences of the latter: taking whims and emotions as knowledge, holding revelations or intuitions as truth instead of seeking evidence, etc. Now, note a key point based on Knowledge and Certainty: certainty is the basic state of human cognition and must be reached for cognition beyond the perceptual level according to the facts in order to deal with reality effectively. Someone who “doubts everything” cannot really doubt everything unless he gives up his consciousness. Hence, he must hold some things as certain. But since he has no means of making the distinction between reality and fantasy, the validity of what he holds as certain is up to chance. Ultimately, both positions (universal doubt and certainty without reason) lead to false or unfounded certainty. Of course, acting on false or unfounded certainty is profoundly irrational and devalues your life since you degrade or destroy your efficacy in dealing with reality.
SIDE NOTE: Universal doubt is also self-contradictory since it holds as certain that nothing is certain.
Hence, we can see the sheer importance in keeping clear what our cognitive purpose is.
This is the fallacy of replacing elements of the context of an idea or add new elements to it that have no basis in the original context. For example, suppose I say “selfishness is a virtue”, with the context being that “selfishness” refers to the idea that the values one acts to gain and/or keep must be gained and/or kept for the sake of one’s own life. It leaves open the question of what value is, in what context does each value exist, how can we act to gain and/or keep it in its appropriate context, etc. Now, if someone sees my statement in isolation but inserts his own context of “selfishness” as meaning “acting for one’s own interests in disregard of other people” (which is not implied by my context at all), he would interpret my statement as promoting callousness toward others and condoning the mistreatment of others, even though these attitudes are against my own position. Here, we see that an idea is taken out of the intended context that gives it its meaning, at which point one’s grasp of the idea is no longer tied to reality (i.e. to the actual intent of the statement and to its actual implications).
This is the fallacy of considering two things or ideas to be similar in some respect just because they are similar in other respects that may be non-essential (note that by ideas, I mean any kind of cognition beyond the perceptual level: units, concepts, contexts, etc.). Examples of integration by non-essentials are: (1) Thinking that something is made of metal just because it shines. (2) Thinking two species have similar mating behaviour due to similar hunting behaviour. (3) Thinking of contractual labour as a form of slavery. (4) Thinking of a foetus as a rights-holding human due it being a biologically distinct human entity. (5) Thinking of capitalism as imperialism because both promote the “expansion of economic influence”. (6) Thinking of outcompeting a job-seeker for a job as the same as outmatching a nation in a war of conquest. (7) Thinking of “trust” as “faith” because both lack “direct evidence”. (8) Thinking of similar outcomes of decisions as showing similar decision-making quality. (9) Thinking of a specific outcome of an action as the key factor in judging the morality of the action (e.g. morally equating cold-blooded murder with killing someone in self-defence).
Now, how can you know integration is done by non-essentials and why bother with integration by essentials? To answer, consider the meaning of “essential”. The more essential a characteristic of a thing is in a given context, the more of the thing’s identity it necessitates and is necessitated by in the given context, i.e. the more of the thing’s identity is integrated by the characteristic in the given context. For example, an essential of butter in the context of gastronomy is the fact that it is a milk-based fat. This characteristic alone integrates much of the nature of butter in a gastronomical context, such as its unique taste compared to other kinds of fats, its use as a fatty substance, the issues it poses for the lactose intolerant, etc. Note that like cognition in general, an essential is both contextual (i.e. based on a body of interrelated facts) and purposeful (i.e. based on a goal or a hierarchy of goals). Hence, an essential is that which is indispensable in integrating the context according to our purpose.
Why does its capacity to integrate the context give an essential such importance? Because by causality, a thing acts as a thing is (see: “The law of causality” from Metaphysics), which means that since a characteristic that is essential for a given context and purpose is key to understanding the nature of a thing or an idea for the given context and purpose, especially long-range or in a broader context, it is also key to understanding how the thing or the idea relates to the rest of reality in the given context with respect to the given purpose, i.e. how it would act, react or play out in reality in the given context with respect to the given purpose. In this light, we see that a non-essential by contrast is that which does not affect the nature of the things or ideas in question in our context with respect to our purpose.
Hence, by integrating by non-essentials, you are no longer dealing with reality since you are in fact making two errors: you are both (1) dropping the context with respect to essential differences and (2) inserting an imagined context with respect to imagined essential similarities. In other words, by integrating by non-essentials, you drop the valid context, insert an invalid context and thereby separate your cognition from reality. Hence, to deal with reality effectively needs the right integration within the right context, which is only achieved through integration by essentials.
How to integrate by essentials?
The model to follow when integrating with essentials is an extension of the method used in concept-formation, which is the basis of any further abstraction (see: Concept-formation). In concept-formation, you identify the broader context in which two kinds of units (concrete or abstract) are the same broader kind of unit. Now, to integrate two narrower kinds of units, they must share some characteristics that only differ in measurement (note that the essence of concept-formation and abstraction in general is measurement-omission). In other words, we must identify the common characteristics, i.e. the conceptual common denominator whose different measurements differentiate the narrower kinds of units from each other. Here, the broader context shows where their essential similarities actually lie and how essential their differences are.
Of course, the breadth of the broader context cannot be arbitrary. Why? Because ultimately, only particulars exist and can be dealt with, which means ultimately, we must bring our decision-making to particulars. Hence, the broader context that is relevant to us is not arbitrarily broad; either we know enough beyond a certain contextual breadth or we cannot deal with things beyond a certain contextual breadth because we have not yet integrated our knowledge enough. Hence, the context in which we can or must operate is based on how integrated our knowledge is, what contextual breadth we have already dealt with and how broad or narrow our decision-making needs to be to pursue our goals effectively. For example, when integrating an airplane and a helicopter in terms of their practical use, integrating them under the concept of “object” would result in a context that is too broad to bring to our focus anything not already in our focus about what we want to know with respect to the pursuit of our goal, which is to understand the similarities in the practical use of specific kinds of machines.
Hence, the practical significance of the differences between two things or ideas is grasped by grasping the practical context we must deal with, which is the context that is broad enough to integrate the two things or ideas while being relevant enough to make sure we bring to our focus something not already in our focus about them with respect to the pursuit of our goals. If it so happens that there is no essential difference between two things or ideas in the practical context that integrates them, i.e. if they are differentiated only by characteristics that are non-essential in that context, then treating them in the same way in that context is proper since you have indeed integrated them by essentials.
To condense the discussion into a short tip…
To know whether something is integrated by essentials or non-essentials, ask: for the given context and purpose, is there something more essential that differentiates them (more essential than their similarities)? If there is, you know you are integrating by non-essentials for the given context and purpose. If there is not, ask: what makes the similarity an essential? In what way does it integrate the identities of the things or ideas in question? Hence, you can know if it is in fact an essential for the given context and purpose or if there must be some other characteristic or set of characteristics that is more significant in shaping the nature of the things or ideas in question for the given context and purpose.
To clarify the discussion so far, consider some examples…
1.
What is wrong with equating economic “conquest”, e.g. outcompeting your competition in business for the sake of economic power, with political conquest, e.g. conquering another nation for the sake of political power. First, we must identify the broader context that integrates both cases, namely the context of human interaction. What is essential to deciding the effectiveness of human interaction on the broadest of terms? The answer: rational freedom, i.e. the freedom to act according to one’s own judgement in the absence of physical coercion in any direction (for the proof of it, see: Morality in a Social Context). Here, we see that the two kinds of conquests are distinguished in the broader context by an essential characteristic of the broader context, namely the use of physical coercion or lack thereof. Economic conquest leaves people unviolated physically, i.e. with respect to their bodies and their property, while political conquest does in fact violate every human right by violating the right to life, autonomy and property.
To show how essentials are key to understanding and dealing with reality, consider what kinds of other characteristics are integrated by the essential characteristics of each kind of conquest. In the first case, the rights of people are protected, economic freedom is safeguarded (which tends toward overall prosperity, all else equal), individual agency is respected both by the state and by other people, leaving people free to pursue their own goals in the long run. In the second case, the principle of individual rights is thrown out in essence, which means economic freedom is not safeguarded and is always under the threat of arbitrary decree, individual agency is not respected in principle by the state, opening the doors to accepting all kinds of evils, such as expropriation of wealth, forced conformity (intellectually and practically) and physical exploitation of those with less political power or favour. Furthermore, consider what incentives does each kind of conquest present and what kinds of people are drawn to the system presupposed by each kind of conquest. In the first case, individual agency and responsibility are emphasised, incentivising the more conscientious, productive and enterprising. Furthermore, since the right to property and economic freedom are safeguarded, the conditions are favourable for long-term economic investment and wealth security. In the second case, physical and political might is emphasised, incentivising a system based not on merit but pull, drawing the unscrupulous and the power-hungry, both as conformists and as perpetrators of physical and economic coercion. It is useful to note that in many real-life cases, systems are mixed, i.e. they have practical and impractical aspects in them, leading to mixed results. In such cases, it is even more important to understand the essential characteristics that cause each part or aspect of the results and not ascribe the results to the system as a whole; doing so would be integrating by non-essentials, i.e. taking the system as a whole to be the essential common denominator for the parts or aspects of the results just because the system is the common denominator for the mixed results as a whole.
2.
Based on the fact that one person’s life would be taken for the sake of five, is it morally equivalent (1) to kill a healthy person to harvest his organs in order to save five others and (2) to divert a train to run over one person tied to a track instead of five people tied to another track? What is wrong in saying they are morally equivalent? The answer is that isolated consequences are non-essential to moral judgement. To understand why, we have to understand the context that makes moral judgement both possible and necessary: an individual’s pursuit of values. Even if you are operating under the idea that a few moral actors must shape the course for the rest of humanity, it is still the case that each moral actor is pursuing an individual value in a broad sense, i.e. he is individually acting to gain and/or keep something (e.g. an aggregate outcome he thinks is desirable).
Morality is, in essence, the study of decision-making at the most fundamental level of human life. In other words, it is the study of the values you must act toward in a broad sense, the virtues that lead to the practice of such action and the broad principles that direct such action. Hence, an essential characteristic in moral judgement is the long-range (i.e broad) principles applied to an action. Considering the two cases in the broader context of “valuing human life”, a moral equivalence can only be made under the principle that the number of human lives saved is an essential moral consideration. Why is it so? Now, valuing a human life has to be with respect to one’s other values, or else it is arbitrary. Hence, what is essential to valuing human life? We observe that an essential characteristic of a human with respect to his practical value to us is his rational faculty. A rational faculty needs the freedom to act in order to be effective in reality, since thought without action ultimately destroys the role of purpose in rationality, which ultimately destroys the capacity to be a rational agent with respect to the demands of reality (i.e. apart from the coercive whims of others). Hence, we see that an essential characteristic in valuing human life in moral terms is the respect for his freedom to act. Hence, morally, we see that the two cases differ in essentials; case 1 actively destroys human agency whereas case 2 does not, since no one has any agency in the given situation to begin with.
To show yet again how essentials are key to understanding and dealing with reality, consider what kinds of other characteristics are integrated by the essential characteristics of each moral basis. The moral basis of case 1 promotes a form of human interaction wherein each person is and should always be in danger of being killed by his fellow humans for the sake of others he may or may not care about. This, of course, is not promoted by the moral basis of case 2. Consider these cases in broader contexts. What kind of life would each individual tend to pursue under each moral code? What kind of community would form (if at all) under each? What kind of political system would take hold and be promoted by each? What kind of general psychological and intellectual state of the population would result from each? It would be a huge undertaking for me to go over each question and, being only an example, it is also not essential to my topic of interest here. Nonetheless, I invite you to think about each question to see how the essential factors shape the nature of things and ideas in reality.
3.
Here are some examples of valid integration, i.e. integration by essentials…
3.1.
In the context of studying the fundamentals of goal-directed behaviour, you would be right to treat as equivalent entities as diverse as a tree, a fungus, an insect, a human, an elephant and a coral. The equivalence is in this context valid since their shared characteristic of self-generated, self-sustaining action is essentially goal-directed.
3.2.
It is valid to consider the professions of “engineer”, “butcher”, “sailor”, “teacher” and “artist” as essentially the same in a moral context, since they are integrated in this context by the essential characteristic of being potentially productive careers, since their shared characteristics of value-creation and trade are the basis of a potentially productive career.
This is the fallacy of considering two things or ideas to be different in some respect just because they are different in other respects that may be non-essential (note that by ideas, I mean any kind of cognition beyond the perceptual level: units, concepts, contexts, etc.). Examples of differentiation by non-essentials are: (1) Considering the core characters of two individuals to be different based on different physical appearances. (2) Considering intellectual capabilities to be different based on different physical capabilities. (3) Considering two cultures to be different in values based on differences in history, language, food habits and clothing. (4) Considering scientific principles to be epistemologically different from moral principles due to differences in their domains of application. (5) The “necessary vs. contingent” dichotomy, wherein two facts about a thing are differentiated in terms of certainty based on whether or not they are part of the thing’s definition in the given context.
This fallacy is very similar in both essence and impact to the fallacy of integration by non-essentials. The justification for differentiating by essentials is basically the same as it is for integrating by essentials. The method of differentiating by essentials and the method of recognising differentiation by non-essentials is also very similar. Just for clarity, I shall reiterate the key points.
How to differentiate by essentials?
The model to follow when integrating with essentials is an extension of the method used in concept-formation, which is the basis of any further abstraction (see: Concept-formation). In concept-formation, you identify the broader context in which two kinds of units (concrete or abstract) are the same broader kind of unit. Now, to differentiate two narrower kinds of units, they must have different measurements of the same broader characteristics (note that the essence of concept-formation and abstraction in general is measurement-omission). In other words, we must identify the common characteristics, i.e. the conceptual common denominator whose different measurements differentiate the narrower kinds of units from each other. Here, the context shows where their essential differences actually lie and how essential their similarities are.
Of course, the breadth of the broader context cannot be arbitrary. Why? Because ultimately, only particulars exist and can be dealt with, which means ultimately, we must bring our decision-making to particulars. Hence, the broader context that is relevant to us is not arbitrarily broad; either we know enough beyond a certain contextual breadth or we cannot deal with things beyond a certain contextual breadth because we have not yet integrated our knowledge enough. Hence, the context in which we can or must operate is based on how integrated our knowledge is, what contextual breadth we have already dealt with and how broad or narrow our decision-making needs to be to pursue our goals effectively. For example, when differentiating between two species of animals in the context of their feeding habits, integrating the species under the concept of “entity” would result in a context that is too broad to bring to our focus anything not already in our focus about what we want to know with respect to the pursuit of our goal, which is to understand the specific feeding behaviours of specific kinds of animals.
Hence, the practical significance of the differences between two things or ideas is grasped by grasping the practical context we must deal with, which is the context that is broad enough to integrate the two things or ideas while being relevant enough to make sure we bring to our focus something not already in our focus about them with respect to the pursuit of our goals. If it so happens that there is no essential similarity between two things or ideas in the practical context that differentiates them, i.e. if they are integrated only by characteristics that are non-essential in that context, then treating them differently in that context is proper since you have indeed differentiated them by essentials.
To condense the discussion into a short tip…
To know whether something is differentiated by essentials or non-essentials, ask: for the given context and purpose, is there something more essential that integrates them (more essential than their differences)? If there is, you know you are differentiating by non-essentials for the given context and purpose. If there is not, ask: what makes the difference an essential? In what way does it differentiate the identities of the things or ideas in question? Hence, you can know if it is in fact an essential for the given context and purpose or if there must be some other characteristic or set of characteristics that is more significant in shaping the nature of the things or ideas in question.