NOTES ON A SUMMARY OF EXISTENTIALISM
Contents:
Main reference: Existentialism from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reality as we experience it is mutable in every respect, hence nothing is absolute. As an aside, note that Platonists accept this, but claim the existence of another non-sensory plane of existence that can never be experienced but may be known through non-sensory, non-experiential means (ex. mystic intuition, divine revelation, other-life memories, etc.).
Mutability in every respect implies unknowability of absolutes. Hence, percepts, concepts, and thereby every form of abstraction are fundamentally arbitrary, i.e. “projections” or “constructs” of our minds. In this view, “objectivity” is impossible since it requires a separation — a transcendence of sorts — from our experience; Platonists regard this as possible (through the “perspective of eternity” or “God’s-eye view”) while existentialists regard this as either impossible or nonsense, either false or pointless (due to being unknowable).
Reaches the inescapable inference from the above metaphysical premises that either (1) “truth” is subjective at best, never objective, or (2) subjective “truth” is more important to human existence than objective “truth”, since objective “truth” is only achievable (if at all) by separating ourselves from the experience of existence as such; this is either impossible or leaves us clueless about the experience of existence as such.
EXCERPT FROM THE TEXT: Kierkegaard reverses the traditional orientation that privileges objectivity by claiming that, when it comes to the question of existence, one’s own subjective truth is “the highest truth attainable”. This means the abstract truths of philosophical detachment are always subordinate to the concrete truths of the existing individual. “The real subject,” writes Kierkegaard, “is not the cognitive subject … the real subject is the ethically existing subject”. And subjective truth cannot be reasoned about or explained logically; it emerges out of the situated commitments, affects, and needs of the individual. For this reason, it does not disclose timeless and objective truths; it discloses “a truth which is true for me”. For Kierkegaard, to live this truth invariably results in feelings of anxiety and confusion because it is objectively uncertain; it has no rational justification, and no one else can understand or relate to it. It is an ineffable truth that is felt rather than known.
COMMENTARY:
It is clear to see how this view justifies or even elevates whim-worship and emotionalism. Furthermore, if “truth” is “ineffable”, rational discourse and argument is practically pointless; only emotional appeals or appeals to — or use of — force remain as ways to resolve conflict.
While fundamentally in agreement with Kierkegaard and the premises of existentialism, Nietzsche presents the idea of “truth” as a practical, convenient construct, specifically a social construct. The “social” aspect of it helps explain why some “truths” are consistently believed, practised and propagated; the “truth” in such cases is not just a subjective view of one mind, but the subjective views of many minds not so easily swayed by any given individual. Moreover, individuals in a society internalise these “truths” to such an extent that their every thought and action are predicated by these “truths”. Nietzsche’s brand of subjectivism, “perspectivism”, extends the idea of subjectivism to subjective “truths” so internalised that they feel objective, i.e. like fact.
To summarise Nietzsche’s epistemological points: (1) “Truths” are only useful social constructs (they endure as long as useful). (2) Fundamentally, there are no facts, only interpretations (perspectivism), which implies that contradictions are equally valid as all interpretations are equally valid. Furthermore, Nietzsche offers a “psychological motivation” for holding fast to some “truths”, as is explained in the excerpt below.
EXCERPT FROM THE TEXT:
Nietzsche goes on to suggest there is a psychological motivation in our shared belief in objective truth. It shelters us from the terrifying contingency and mutability of existence. Nietzsche understands that human beings are vulnerable and frightened creatures, and the belief in truth—even though it is an illusion—has social and pragmatic utility by providing a measure of coherence and reliability. We need these truths for psychological protection, to help us cope with an otherwise chaotic and precarious existence. “Truth,” therefore, “is that sort of error without which a certain species of life could not live”.
Heidegger carries forward the above premises and conclusions, but also more openly rejects both the need for and the validity of the law of identity. He is also unique in that he does not deny the existence of “truth” in the metaphysical sense (as do Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) but rather holds that consciousness fundamentally — metaphysically — creates truth, i.e. “meaning”. In his words, “Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein.” Taken in context with Heidegger’s other views, this is not merely a statement about how the self and the world are both a part of existence as such. This is a statement that implies that the relationship between reality and consciousness is not one wherein reality is primary and consciousness is a part of it, but as one wherein reality and consciousness are equally fundamental to the point of being the same in essence, fundamentally inseparable. This is the idea of “reality” being a “projection” or “construct” of reality but given metaphysical significance rather than just stated as an epistemological position. For example, a pencil is a pencil in reality because that is the meaning our intention-based involvement with existence creates and that is what we experience as a result.
Now, consider this line from the text: What appears to us in the immediacy of lived experience is always shaped by the public meanings we grow into. Here, we see how Heidegger explains shared and maybe persistent experiences of “meaning”. This is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s idea of how shared and seemingly persistent “truths” are internalised subjective views of the society. However, unlike Nietzsche, Heidegger seems to give these “truths” a metaphysical significance; these “truths” to him are subjective, but they are also real, i.e. truly a part of existence. In other words, we have internalised these publicly-enforced “truths” (“public meanings”) to such an extent that our intention-based involvement cannot help but create such a “meaning”.
His views reveal a false dichotomy: on the one side is (1) data that holds intrinsic context (based on absolutes that transcend experience), and on the other side is (2) data that is given context at a fundamental, existential level by intention (i.e. conscious intention, namely ours, either as individuals or as a society).
EXCERPTS FROM THE TEXT:
1.
When we engage with and handle objects in the world, we give them meaning; we encounter them as meaningful.
Note that “meaning” here may be interpreted as “truth” or “essence”; hence, the essence of something is not grasped but created by consciousness, with its experience of “meaning” as an after-effect of its own creation.
2.
The experience of hearing, for example, is not a representation of bare sense data because sounds are invariably coloured by the context of meaning we are thrown into. We hear some-thing: we hear “the thunder of the heavens, the rustling of the woods, the rumbling of the motors, the noises of the city”…
COMMENTARY: Heidegger presents a key idea, namely that the self (consciousness) and reality (existence) are not just integrated but the same fundamentally. This is an implicit basis for the primacy of consciousness, i.e. the view that consciousness is the basis of reality. While Heidegger does not explicitly state this, it is clear that if consciousness and existence is one, consciousness is existence and vice versa, i.e. consciousness is the fundamental source of any truth (or “meaning” as Heidegger may put it).
Existentialism tackles the false dichotomy of the “mind-body split” by stating that the body is not a vessel for the mind but the medium of experience itself. In other words, the body is not separate from the self but an integral part of the self; this is the concept of embodiment in existentialism, i.e. the view that the self is not separate from the body, but rather that the self is embodied, i.e. is manifested as the body.
Embodiment is, in essence, an extension of the primacy of consciousness to the self with all its attributes (physical and spiritual). In this view, the self becomes what the self internalises and thereby projects onto reality. In other words, what we are is the result of our “embodied perspective”, i.e. our internalised self-image. In essence, this is the meaning-giving activity (referred to by Heidegger) applied to the self.
What is essence? From context (for example, the line “existence as a self-making process”), we can understand “essence” as “the nature of things”, i.e. “identity”. The view that existence (which, as previously established in existentialism, is the same in essence as consciousness and is formed by conscious intent) precedes essence (i.e. identity) is a logical extension of the primacy of consciousness; if consciousness is primary, nothing has a nature before the self creates it. An inescapable conclusion of this view is that the “self” also has no essence, i.e. no identity, as expressed in the self-contradictory statement from the text, “… we are always other than ourselves, that we don’t fully coincide with who we are.”
In this view, the “facts” do exist, i.e. constraints on our will, but these are not objective but ultimately subjective (i.e. ultimately rooted in conscious intent, internalised or otherwise). In this view, facts are meant not to be accepted and dealt with as they are, but rather, transcended by our conscious intent. The meaning of “transcend” is made clear in the line in the text, “This idea that facticity can always be nullified or negated by our choices reveals the key to understanding the existentialist conception of freedom.” Based on the context of ideas so far, we can say that “transcend” does not mean to change facts by enacting the right causes based on our objective knowledge and capacity, but to change facts by intent primarily (ideally by intent alone).
EXCERPTS FROM THE TEXT:
1.
Existence is a reflexive or relational tension between “facticity” and “transcendence,” where we are constrained by our facticity but simultaneously endowed with the freedom to exceed or transcend it.
2.
Sartre will go so far as to say that human existence is fundamentally “indefinable” and that “there is no human nature” because there is no aspect of our facticity that can fully describe us. Our facticity reveals itself to us only through the self-defining meanings and values that we give to it.
3.
“If man […] is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be” — Sartre
The basis of ethics of existentialism follows from the epistemology; subjectivity in epistemology translates to subjectivity in ethics (see excerpt 1 below). As for the purpose of life, as with “truth”, “purpose” is created by consciousness and does not have an objective basis (see excerpt 2 below).
In this light, “freedom” i.e. freedom to project our intent onto reality is the basis of ethics. Existentialism does not adopt a solipsistic view, so if freedom is the essence of conscious existence, then the essence of the existence of other consciousnesses (apart from our own) is also freedom. Sartre adds that this fact implies that just as we must realise our freedom, we must work to help others realise their freedom (see excerpt 3 below). The basis of such a responsibility seems to be the view that the only way people can coexist in freedom is if none tries to objectify the other; if any one does, the other may need to do the same out of self-protection. This means that to be able to coexist in freedom is to recognise the freedom of the other and help the other recognise the same in both you and him (thus the aforementioned responsibility). This view relates to the idea of “authenticity” in existentialism, that is explored next.
EXCERPTS FROM THE TEXT:
1.
“It must be understood,” as Beauvoir writes in The Ethics of Ambiguity, “that the passion in which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits its being called useful.”
2.
Beauvoir admits it is true that the human being “has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it cannot justify itself, that it cannot give itself reasons for being that it does not have.” It is human existence itself “which makes values spring up in the world on the basis of which it will be able to judge the enterprise in which it will be engaged.”
3.
“We want freedom for freedom’s sake and in every particular circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that freedom of others depends on ours […] I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom”
“Usual” state…
Inauthenticity, wherein we look at others through what the other sees us as. Due to the subjective nature of reality as argued in existentialism, such a view forces us to internalise constraints, which we then project onto reality and thus fail to realise our freedom (i.e. to “transcend” the facts). Hence, such a view then requires us to use others as a means to our freedom, since it is their views of us that determines what we internalise and thus project onto reality. Logically, then, to assert freedom in this view is best done by forcing others to think and act as we want them to, so that their views may then support what we want to internalise and thus project onto reality.
Such a dynamic creates a constant tug-of-war between individuals. Clearly, then, the only way to true freedom is to recognise the freedom in others and help them recognise both theirs and our freedom. This creates an equivalence between freedom and morality, as expressed in the following (paraphrased or quoted from the text):
As a moral stance, authentic being-for-others is a form of reciprocity that involves “the mutual recognition of two freedoms […] [where] neither would give up transcendence [and] neither would be mutilated…” In this way authenticity and morality belong together, whereby we have a shared obligation to liberate or free each other so that we can create ourselves and take responsibility for the life we lead. Therefore, as Beauvoir puts it, “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision”. Integrating Heidegger’s ideas (given in the excerpts below), we get the ethical principle that we must act in such a way as to the realisation of our own freedom and the realisation of freedom for others.
MORE EXCERPTS FROM THE TEXT:
1.
We resist the temptation to “leap-in” (einspringen) for the Other, as if the Other were a dependent thing or object that needs to be sheltered from the unsettling question of existence.
2.
As Heidegger writes, we leap-ahead of the Other, “not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to them authentically as such for the first time”.
This, according to some views within existentialism (there exist other perspectives), is how we remain authentic even as we interact with others for their sakes. In brief, we do the following: (1) Recognise our and the other’s freedom, which implies that we do not objectify the other or treat them as a means for your self-view. (2) Help the other recognise the same in themself and in us.
To begin with, this view mirrors the one above in that it holds that our usual view of the other is as a means to assert a sense of self-control, which leads us to objectify the other (the “I-It” (Ich-Es) relation in the words of Martin Buber). But this view differs from perspective 1 in the reason behind why such objectification disables our freedom. Unlike perspective 1, the basis here is that we exist not as individuals seeking to realise freedom but rather as “relational beings who are fundamentally bound together in mutual vulnerability”. The basis of perspective 2, hence, is the view of a human as not essentially free but essentially dependent (on other humans or consciousnesses). Note that the premises held in existentialist metaphysics and epistemology is not contradicted by such a view.
Authenticity in this view is, in essence, mutual vulnerability, i.e. the recognition of ourselves and others as defenceless, exposed and essentially dependent (materially and spiritually); “we are not isolated individuals but beings who are always in living relation with others”. This view goes against the premises of individual subjectivism.
PERSONAL NOTE: Perspective 2 also goes against the objective fact that a human is fundamentally (metaphysically and epistemologically) an independent agent capable of pursuing values even on his own (although other people are potentially of immense value, and social interaction vastly expands the potential of each individual).
Extending from the previous ideas, engagement is based on the idea that though a human is essentially undefined and self-defined (harkening back to the idea that “existence precedes essence”), the reality of social constraints or even social oppression must be engaged with due to how we are driven to internalise it and act to perpetuate it either as victims or perpetrators. This makes engagement in the social sphere necessary and possible, since systems of oppression are self-perpetuating (hence it is necessary to oppose them) but also not intrinsic to reality (hence it is possible to oppose them).
This view may be seen as an extension of perspective 1 (although this is not exactly accurate), wherein both one may be unable to realise freedom due to existing structures constraining the “possibilities of choice” (see excerpt 1 below) by helplessly growing into and internalising freedom-limiting views, actions, social structures and practices. However, it is possible that this view departs from perspective 1 and draws from perspective 2 in order to justify itself, since it is only in perspective 2 that humans are regarded as essentially dependent (thus unable to achieve freedom despite social conditions).
But it rather seems that the basis of the idea of engagement has different (though similar) premises. Clues about the nature of the premises behind this view are given by the following excerpts:
1.
Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular served as decisive influences on the project of “de-centering the subject” in Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction and in Michel Foucault’s genealogy of power, demonstrating how the subject is not the privileged center or origin of truth and knowledge. The subject is, rather, shaped in advance by sociohistorical structures, an overlapping network of norms and practices, linguistic conventions, and shared meanings, and this shaping takes place in a way that we are never fully conscious of. The individual, on this view, is more of a placeholder or crossing point in these anonymous structures, where the subject exists as “the inscribed surface of events […] totally imprinted by history” (Foucault 1977, 148).
2.
Of course, existentialists reject the idea that this historical imprinting or “decentering” is total or absolute. They are, after all, still committed to the value of freedom and authenticity, but they recognize that freedom is never unconditioned. Beyond the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche, we see this recognition in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of mediated freedom, in Sartre’s postwar account of “freedom-in-situation,” and in what Beauvoir calls “la force des choses” (the power of circumstances).
In essence, we are free insofar as we are conscious, but our existence is not all conscious and includes a lot of things “we are never fully conscious of”. This is a way to try to avoid the obvious contradictions of perspective 1 (with respect to reality) while at the same time recognising the freedom that consciousness has (to create reality or transcend facts) as necessitated by existentialism’s metaphysical and epistemological premises.
On closer examination of some existentialist ideas seen previously, we see that this view that we cannot be conscious of everything pertaining to our existence is a logical necessity of the idea of “embodiment”, as explained in the following excerpt:
Existentialism illuminates how—as a situated way of being-in-the-world—human beings already embody a tacit understanding of the world in a way that we are not and can never be thematically conscious of.
The idea of embodiment is what coherently ties together the notion of “freedom” with the need for engagement to overthrow oppressive social constructs in a more objective sense; our consciousness is free, but the self is not all about consciousness. It is key here to extend the idea of the “self” beyond consciousness. While I regard this idea as valid by itself (i.e. in isolation), it is interesting to note that the premise of the “primacy of consciousness” is still not abandoned. Rather it is extended such that it is not an individual consciousness that can create reality but multiple consciousnesses across time and space (“society”, “history”, “tradition”, “culture”, etc.), each one unconscious in some way that some others are not.
MORE EXCERPTS FROM THE TEXT:
1.
Here we see existentialists making the connection that for the Other to realize their freedom, philosophy must engage the “bases and structures” that limit and constrain them.
2.
Human beings have no essential nature; no one is born inferior or submissive. We are constituted intersubjectively by growing into, internalizing, and enacting ready-made structures of oppression.