VALUES AND VIRTUES
Contents:
Value (defined earlier but not in detail):
A value is something (any part or aspect of reality) that one acts to gain and/or keep, i.e. it is not one’s action but the achievable object of one’s action. For example, independence is a state wherein one is able to live based on his own work, product and judgement. If one acts to gain and/or keep independence and is capable of doing so, it becomes a value.
NOTE: Achievability is key; you cannot — in fact — act to gain and/or keep something that you necessarily cannot gain and/or keep by the nature of your existence.
Virtue:
A virtue is an attribute that defines a category of actions required to gain and/or keep one or more values. For example, honesty is an attribute that defines a category of actions based on one characteristic; adherence to truth insofar as it is grasped. The value gained and/or kept by honesty is reason.
Derivative value:
A derivative value is not necessarily a lower value, but simply a value whose meaning is derived from another value or set of values. To derive a value X from a set of values P, achieving and maintaining P is a logical necessity in order to achieve and maintain X. Note that logical necessity may be two-directional as well.
Higher and lower values:
If X is a higher value than Y, then one acts more overall to gain and/or keep X than Y, i.e. the achievement of X is the more important, more fundamental goal.
Life is the source of purpose and the standard of value, and is the ultimate value (i.e. the only end in itself). What life is to an entity objectively depends on the kind of being the living entity is. To a volitional being, life is both the actual sustenance of life and the potential to sustain life; both the actual and the potential are aspects of the same integrated whole (i.e. the reality of life). Thus, to a volitional being, what matters is not merely the sustenance of life but the potential of life in the long-run, i.e. in the broadest context available to the being. In other words, for a volitional being, to live requires not only sustaining life but also finding life worth sustaining (“worth” implies potential as integrated to the actual, i.e. the capacity to pursue and concretise a potential in actual fact).
My life (as a volitional being) is my core value. The basic category of actions required to pursue this value, i.e. the basic virtue to hold is self-interest, i.e. egoism. This involves the pursuit of any value I can identify that supports my core value, starting with the fundamental values of reason and purpose (to be discussed shortly). Hence, combined with these fundamental values, an expansion of the virtue of egoism is rational, purposeful egoism (given the established metaphysical and epistemological context, “egoism” and “rational, purposeful egoism” are equivalent; egoism properly understood is necessarily rational and purposeful). I shall discuss this more after elaborating some other values and virtues.
Since all values are ultimately aspects of the value of life, all virtues are ultimately aspects of egoism, i.e. self-oriented value-seeking. Hence, “life” and “egoism” are the abstractions that integrate all moral values and virtues. However, since the essence of abstraction is measurement omission, the value of life and egoism require that we progressively concretise them with more particular aspects. Furthermore, since all values and virtues are tied together by one standard, no value or virtue exists in isolation and can only exist in the context of other values and virtues. In the following parts, we shall explore the fundamental, most abstract aspects of life and egoism.
Speaking of virtues in particular, note that reason is man’s fundamental volitional means of survival, since it is the only means to volitionally know reality and thus volitionally deal with it effectively (“reason” not as an isolated feature but as an aspect of the functioning mind and body). Note that virtue is based on the use of one’s volition. Hence, rationality is the fundamental virtue that supports and advances self-preservation, which means it is the fundamental virtue that derives from an egoistic approach to life. Hence, every virtue is essentially an aspect of the virtue of rationality.
NOTE: To make searching through the text easier, I have marked values with a bold + underline style and virtues with a bold + italic style.
Reason is the only means to know reality and extend one’s knowledge in the broadest context, namely life lived long-range. Thus, it is our primary means of dealing with reality in terms of both the actual and the potential (i.e. the present, the short-range and the long-range). Hence, it is a fundamental value, and its corresponding virtue is rationality. The achievement of reason requires one to act such that the truth is not evaded, i.e. not wilfully ignored. Hence, self-honesty is another virtue that is fundamental to reason, since it is an aspect of objectivity and thus of rationality. Self-honesty is acting such that you neither falsify (in any way) nor hide the truth from yourself, insofar as you grasp the truth.
Honesty as a whole also involves the communication of truth to others. This is not a fundamental virtue in the pursuit of reason itself, since what you communicate to others does not necessarily lead to the evasion of truth in your own rational processes. To the extent that it does, however, it is a virtue in the pursuit of reason. For example, if lying to others about yourself makes it easier to believe these lies yourself, honesty toward others is — all other things being equal — more in line with the pursuit of reason. Similarly, falsifying a scientific finding as a scientist hampers the progress of increasing my knowledge of the world, since (1) others would not be able to utilise the right findings and discover more about reality, (2) I would damage or destroy my ability to collaborate with others in the pursuit of knowledge, and (3) I would set a precedent for a behaviour that would cause scientific advancement to suffer in the long run. In short, such dishonesty degrades or destroys my potential for life and values. Note that this logic also applies to any pursuit of knowledge.
In a social context, being honest is, in general, a way of valuing the other person. How? Consider: man’s primary means of survival is his mind, and his mind needs the truth to grasp reality so that he can act effectively in reality. Hence, in general, being honest is a way to respect the other’s mind, perceptiveness, reason and, consequently, the other’s life as a volitional being. Of course, not everyone deserves such respect. In particular, being truthful to someone (apart from yourself) would be immoral, i.e. dishonest to your own values, if it would (in your knowledge) lead to harm or loss to your life and/or your more fundamental values; hence, it would be moral to lie to, say, a thug, an agent of legal oppression, etc. In short, honesty is a way of valuing other people, and in general, the extent to which you are honest with them reveals the extent to which you value them.
NOTE: Honesty consists of the respect for truth and reality (which includes one’s values), which means honesty does not mean simply “not lying” but rather “not misleading or obfuscating the truth intentionally”; hence, hiding or omitting relevant details, intentionally equivocating or being ambiguous so as to mislead or confuse, projecting an intentionally misleading tone, etc. are all forms of dishonesty.
Key to the pursuit of rationality is the recognition of the fact that the focusing of one’s mind to grasp the facts has to be an individual act of will. In other words, just as someone else cannot eat for you, someone else also cannot think for you. The recognition and the affirmation of this fact in both thought and action is the virtue of independence. Importantly, just as rationality is not separate from purpose and practical action (see: “Purpose and productivity”), independence cannot be solely intellectual independence and has to be concretised through action as well.
Life is the standard of value, and achieving the value of life requires pursuing goals (i.e. purposes) that sustain and advance it, which either are or are based on the pursuit of concrete goals to achieve concrete values. Furthermore, the pursuit of value in terms of the potential of life must not be merely the acquisition of values as they exist in nature but the creation of value beyond the actual and toward some potential (it is possible to do so due to reason, which can integrate knowledge beyond the present and help grasp the potential of that which exists). Hence, purpose is a fundamental value, and its corresponding virtue is productivity, i.e. the category of actions that lead to the production of value, i.e. creation of concrete values that integrate into broader values, the broadest of which is the value for my life.
SIDE NOTE: Epistemologically, we derive concrete values from broader values, but metaphysically, concretes are the source of everything, both in knowledge and in values. Hence, metaphysically, the value for my life is rooted in the concrete affirmation of my life in the moment, which involves both the concretisation of values as well as the concretisation of potential.
NOTE: Productivity is the virtue of creating value, but it does not specify the form of the value being created. It does not necessarily mean money-making virtues, although such virtues are a part of it. For example, productivity could be in the form of the following:
The primary means to realise my potential for life is to internalise the virtues that make life possible long-range. In other words, I must strive to internalise my potential for life as a volitional being as a precondition for pursuing life to the fullest (this is crucial, since living as a volitional being requires self-initiated, self-driven action). In other words, in the pursuit of my life, I must strive to achieve self-esteem (i.e. value for the aspects of me that are core to my existence as a volitional being). Hence, self-esteem is another fundamental value in the pursuit of my life. Note that the virtue corresponding to self-esteem is pride — i.e. moral ambitiousness (a definition given by Ayn Rand) — which is the category of actions involving me regarding my self-made attributes and ultimately the self-made aspects of my identity with value. Hence, pride is a virtue insofar as it is based on rational self-esteem (again, adding “rational” is redundant and is only for emphasis; self-esteem is only possible if it corresponds to reason). Note that pride is not only a consequence but also a driver for your actions toward self-esteem — we shall discuss this later. Note also that self-esteem serves as a means to guide your reason and purpose and, by its very nature, is not independent of these other values.
NOTE 1: Self-esteem and pride are based on the volitional aspects of myself, i.e. on my choices and the internalised means and results of making my choices (e.g. my character, my self-earned attributes, including self-earned strengths, skills, abilities, etc.). Consequently, self-maintenance and self-advancement of my valuable aspects that were not initially self-earned is also a cause for pride and self-esteem.
NOTE 2: One of the basic forms of self-esteem is the recognition of one’s own efficacy (cognitive and physical) in reality. Here, it is not the level of efficacy that is morally significant, but rather, the fact that efficacy exists at all, which it does if you are alive and capable of doing at least something for your life.
Note that I can and should value my other aspects according to the value they represent to my life, but such value would be more appreciation or gratitude than pride. Appreciation is the recognition of the values in one’s life, extending to values beyond one’s own achievement. Gratitude is appreciation as applied to the valuable results of the volitional actions of other people. Such a distinction between appreciation and gratitude is important, since the nature of volitional actions of other people is fundamentally different (in terms of actual causes and potential effects) from acts of nature.
NOTE: Appreciation is a broader concept that subsumes gratitude and self-evaluative pride (though not pride as such). Appreciation in general means the positive evaluation of something. In this section, I use appreciation as against gratitude and self-evaluative pride to distinguish between a broader appreciation of the positives in life and the more specific kinds of appreciation whose differences correspond to essentially different forms of value-orientation (self-generated value-orientation for self-evaluative pride vs. non-self-generated value-orientation for gratitude).
I argue that the virtue of pride (i.e. pride as “moral ambitiousness”) is the driver of moral purpose, hence is more fundamental than appreciation, gratitude and self-evaluative pride. That being said, neither appreciation nor gratitude nor self-evaluative pride are more fundamental than each other, since all focus on different yet equally important aspects of my being. Self-evaluative pride can serve to fuel me, giving me the drive and confidence to act volitionally, whereas gratitude reminds me to value what I have thanks to the volitional actions of other people, while appreciation in general is the recognition of value that extends to values beyond what I have achieved myself. Recognition of value is key to acting to gain and/or keep it, hence appreciation, self-evaluative pride and gratitude are vital.
I must strive to pursue value and to never contradict this pursuit; to the extent that I contradict it, to that extent I am rejecting the standard of value and subverting my life. Hence, I must integrate my actions with objectively validated values and principles, i.e. I must have integrity. Integrity is, in essence, the law of non-contradiction as a moral concept, because it affirms that the pursuit of value can never be achieved through the contradiction of values in practice, i.e. in action. The full achievement of integrity in a broader sense (achieved over time with the practice of moral integrity) is the fullest achievement of efficacy in life and the pursuit of values. More precisely, it is the integration of reason and emotion, mind and body, the intellect and the subconscious (which includes instincts and intuition).
Morality is the study of fundamental truths by which I must make choices, and hence, it applies to me individually, primarily. However, like any principle, it applies as well to more specific contexts, including a social context, i.e. a context involving other rational beings. Note that the social context comes under the broader context of my life as a whole, and hence, there is no conflict between “social values” and “individual values” if properly (i.e. rationally) defined; the former are an extension of the latter.
SIDE NOTE: A social context is a more specific context in morality, since the source of morality is the individual. To put it another way, my life includes my life alone as well as with other people, which means a social context in my life is just part of my life.
A fundamental fact relevant in a social context is: value can only be produced by rational beings exercising reason, and conversely, rational beings are the only kinds of entities that produce value long-range, i.e. create value from the material of nature through long-range purpose (“value” here includes knowledge, which is a crucial value for the effective exercise of reason). This fact makes a rational being an irreplaceable value; even mere coexistence with such a being is of irreplaceable potential beyond the physical use of any lower being (“lower” in this context means non-rational or instinctual). Such value is sharpened by the fact that such a being would likely have (1) different capabilities, at least due to the ability to apply his time and effort in other ways than me, but also due to his other abilities likely differing from mine, and (2) a reciprocal value for me as a rational being, thus making possible the exchange of value for value, which has the potential for expanding the values in one’s life due to differing but complementary needs, wants, capacities and abilities.
Now, note that the aforementioned value for a rational being is predicated on his ability to exercise his reason. Hence, we come to the second fundamental fact relevant in a social context: the exercise of reason requires volition, which requires freedom from coercion (i.e. freedom from the initiation of physical force). Treating a rational being any less is to destroy his irreplaceable potential to me, which is anathema to my moral standard. There is also the matter of reciprocity, i.e. if I want to be left free to act, I must leave others free to act; however, this is only a secondary consideration. The primary consideration is that treating a rational being in a way that undermines his ability to reason — i.e. his ability to act according to the facts of reality apart from the subjective whims of others — is anti-life to me fundamentally (i.e. in the broader context of my life as a whole). Note that the idea of freedom cannot be contradictory; freedom is only the freedom from physical coercion and physical harm (the reasons shall be explored later).
Beyond this baseline, I must treat others according to the values they represent; their virtues, trade (in material and spiritual exchange of values), etc. Treating them any other way would undermine my own pursuit of values, as it would undermine either their ability to represent the values they do or my ability to gain the values they represent. If they represent a threat to my pursuit of values, I must treat them as such (with force, if necessary; the proper use of force shall be discussed later). Therefore, the primary virtue with regards to other people is justice, i.e. treating someone as they deserve, i.e. according to the value (or lack or negation thereof) that they objectively represent to me (the use of “objectively” is here redundant and only for emphasis).
NOTE: Gratitude is an application of justice:
Drawing from insights in Objectivist ethics, we see that gratitude is in fact an application of justice, since it consists of treating other people according to the value they (through their volitional actions) represent to us. Similarly, we can also see how admiration, denunciation, acknowledgement, neglect, praise, blame, etc. are forms of justice, provided they are grounded in reason.
Pride is both a feeling and a virtue. In this sense, it is both descriptive and prescriptive. The virtue of pride involves holding high standards of conduct and — consequently — of character. The feeling of pride is the result of and potentially a fuel for the virtue of pride. The virtue is primary; the feeling of pride without the virtue is vanity.
“The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term: “moral ambitiousness.””
— The Objectivist Ethics, “The Virtue of Selfishness” by Ayn Rand, page 27
SIDE NOTE: Ayn Rand’s full quote on pride (formatted into points):
The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term: “moral ambitiousness.” It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one’s own highest value by achieving one’s own moral perfection — which one achieves
Above all, it means one’s rejection of the role of a sacrificial animal, the rejection of any doctrine that preaches self-immolation as a moral virtue or duty.
Pride is the virtue corresponding to the value of self-esteem. Self-esteem is, in essence, the value for oneself. Combined with reason and purpose, the value of self-esteem is what makes all other values and consequently the pursuit of life possible. Hence, pride means achieving the value for oneself, and thus, the value for one’s own life.
For more on pride, especially in practice, see: “Pride as the key to the pursuit of values” from Pride and Moral Perfection from Philosophy in Practice.
If life is the standard of value, then there can be no value placed higher than oneself. The full achievement of this standard and of one’s value for oneself is the egoism that desires the best in all things, in values of matter and spirit. At the base of such egoism is the aim to achieve one’s own moral perfection.
For more on moral perfection, especially in practice, see: “Moral perfection” from Pride and Moral Perfection from Philosophy in Practice.